The particular status of the Tribunal as an ad hoc mechanism meant that it had to interact with the political context in which it operated in order to be able to function internally. Judge Cassese lamented in 1995 that the Tribunal is 'like a giant who has no arms and no legs. To walk and work, he needs artificial limbs. These artificial limbs are the state authorities; without their help the Tribunal cannot operate'. 1 Unlike at Nuremberg, the Tribunal did not find its accused already in custody, nor did it have control over the territory in which the crimes were committed. Although it had an investigative and a prosecutorial arm to carry out investigations and litigation, it was lacking a police force to carry out arrests, and had to ask for outside assistance to provide security and logistical support for investigators, as well as provide access to evidence and witnesses. Financial, political, diplomatic, logistic, and military support was, therefore, a requirement for the Tribunal to be able to deliver justice; not only from the States in the region, but also from other States and international governmental and non-governmental organizations.
Not only did the artificial limbs have to be put in place; they also needed to be operated. The need for State cooperation imposed an additional burden on the Prosecutor and President of the Tribunal to play a diplomatic and political role, as well as a judicial one. 2 First, there was a concerted effort to enhance the public profile of the Tribunal, and to ensure that its voice was heard. This was crucial in the early years, evinced by a high level of activity during the tenure of Goldstone and Cassese, particularly at the time of the signing of the Dayton Accords, and early stages of implementation in 1995-6. 3 Second, diplomatic relations were conducted by