The Critique of Judgement divides fundamentally into three parts—the Introduction, the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, and the Critique of Teleological Judgement. In this chapter I will be concentrating primarily on the salient aspects of the first two of these.
Kant's main arguments in the Introduction begin with Section II . They are somewhat difficult to follow, but hinge on the following points. Understanding, with its pure concepts of nature, legislates what form the phenomenal world will take. Reason, in contrast, legislates for our practical vocation as autonomous supersensible beings. Now, while in the phenomenal world the effects of these legislative powers can modify one another (e.g. our moral decisions can override our sensible inclinations), such powers are, qua legislative, logically independent of one another. As Kant puts it, a 'great gulf' exists between them. However,
the concept of freedom is meant to actualise in the sensible world the end proposed by its laws; and nature must consequently also be capable of being regarded in such a way that in the conformity to law of its form at least harmonises with the possibility of the ends to be effectuated in it according to the laws of freedom. 1
But why must nature be capable of being thought of as ordered in harmony with the realization of our moral ends? Kant's answer to this is, in effect, a continuation and completion of the thesis concerning the absolute primacy of practical reason (discussed in the preceding chapter of this study). For example, in Section IX