Until after the Second World War, constitutional judicial review, that is, the power of a court to invalidate a statute or other action of government because it is in conflict with the constitution, really flourished in only three countries: the United States, Canada, and Australia. This obvious finding of comparative law led to a number of causal hypotheses.
First, successful constitutional judicial review is caused by and may be requisite to successful federalism. At the time these three countries were, with one more, the only really working federalisms among the nations of the world. And the one extra, Switzerland, also had a form of judicial review, although a much weaker one. This hypothesis was supported by the argument that a federalism required some institution to police its complex constitutional boundary arrangements. In more contemporary, public choice terms, the member States of a federalism have entered into a joint contract, each because it sees more benefit from entering than not entering. Even though each will wish to violate specific terms of the contract from time to time,