In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passions never fail to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.
Madison et al., Federalist, No. 55
The extended argument of the previous chapters began with abstract questions about the moral status of persons and ended with some concrete proposals for reforming current global institutions. A single text is a small torch for illuminating this long path—the path of a liberal theory of justice and democracy that is neither statist nor territorialist nor deliberative. I see no reason to punish the careful reader by recapitulating each step in the argument. Instead, I shall bring out the distinctive features of Responsive Democracy by contrasting this theory with the theories of Rawls, as the exemplar of liberal statism, and Habermas, as the exemplar of deliberative democracy. This comparative approach enables me to provide a broader perspective on why the ideas underlying Responsive Democracy might in a few crucial respects make for a more coherent and felicitous theory than these leading alternatives. The approach also allows me to elaborate on how various features of Responsive Democracy are connected and to cast light on some areas left under-explored. The murkiest and most unsettling of these areas is, of course, the relationship between justice and democracy.
Normative theories of justice and democracy can be understood and compared in terms of ten dimensions that are rarely kept sufficiently