A wide variety of extant and proposed policies seek to accommodate cultural pluralism; these do not lend themselves to being normatively analyzed as a single group. On the other hand, many of them do rise or fall by similar arguments. This chapter seeks to identify those cultural rights-claims which are morally alike and (as importantly) those which are unlike one another. It offers a way of sorting those policies which may facilitate and clarify such arguments.
Normative work on cultural rights is difficult to structure. One can rarely say with any precision what implications a given philosophical turn had for the sets of policies being endorsed or disparaged. Arguing by analogy from one case to another is necessary, but it is also frustrating without a framework for identifying the traits which made policies like or unlike in relevant ways.
Drawing purely philosophical distinctions sometimes provides little guidance in sorting actual institutions or policies. The discussion about individual and collective rights, for example, important as it is on a philosophical level, provides little guidance when confronting concrete policies and rights-claims, some of which seem to fit into neither category, some of which are all-too-easily redescribed as part of either one. Yael Tamir 1 derives the right of a national group to its own (not necessarily independent) government from the individual right to practice one's culture, and argues that this derivation means national self-determination should be understood as an individual right. Darlene Johnston holds that 'the prevalence of collective wrongs such as apartheid and genocide demonstrates the need for collective rights.' 2 This seems to redescribe, for example the right not to be murdered by one's government as a group right. Such redescriptions in one direction or the other are not unique, and the variety of usages of 'collective right'—which can refer to a right to a public good or a social good, a right which could