So far as I have observed, projects for Companylaw reform have concerned only the methods pursued in the formation of companies. They have had for their aims to restrain the fraudulent doings of promoters, and to prevent delusion of the public by the parading of apparently-responsible directors whose influential names have been indirectly purchased. But no thought appears to have been given to abuses existing in the administrations of established companies. Extremely grave evils are, however, to be observed in these, and it is high time they should be checked.
Bred of the great political superstition that there is no limit to the powers of a Parliamentary majority (except the limit of physical impossibility) there has long prevailed, and now appears more dominant than ever, the notion that, given any kind of elected body--council, directors, or what not--which was created for a generally-understood purpose, a majority of it may undertake other purposes never contemplated when its members were appointed. In an