1. Alexis de Tocqueville, “Why Democratic Nations Naturally Desire Peace, and Democratic Armies, War,” book 2, chap. 22, Democracy in America.
2. Exceptions include Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Declines,” Terrorism and Political Violence3, no. 1 (1991): 69–87, and Jon B. Alterman, “How Terrorism Ends,” Special Report No. 48, U.S. Institute of Peace, May 25, 1999, as well as a few comparative case studies such as Jeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr, “Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States,” Comparative Politics 21, no. 4 (July 1989): 405–26; and Rogelio Alonso, “Pathways Out of Terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country: The Misrepresentation of the Irish Model,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 695–713.
3. A detailed discussion of the various forms and meanings of “al-Qaeda” is undertaken in chapter 7.
4. Authors who argue that this threat is fundamentally new include Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War against America (New York: Random House, 2003) and The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting It Right (New York: Owl Books, 2006); Michael Scheuer, “The Plotters against America,” Washington Post Book World, November 26, 2006, 4; Ian O. Lesser et al., Countering the New Terrorism(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999); and L. Paul Bremer, “A New Strategy for the New Face of Terrorism” National Interest, November 2001, 23–30.
5. This position was brilliantly argued by Paul Johnson in “The Age of Terror,” New Statesman, November 29, 1974, 763–64.
6. Caleb Carr, “Terrorism as Warfare: The Lessons of Military History,” World Policy Journal 13, no. 4 (Winter 1996–97): 2.
7. Most attacks occurred in democratic states or targeted civilians of those states. For supporting data, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Rethinking Sovereignty: American Strategy in the Age of Terror,” Survival 44, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 119–39.
8. Abu Daoud, quoted by Zeina Karam, “For Planner of Assault on Munich Olympics, No Regret Three Decades Later,” Associated Press, February 23, 2006.
9. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); and Martha Crenshaw, “Coercive Diplomacy and the Response to Terrorism,” chap. 8 of The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 305–357.
10. Internationally in the 1990s, the number averaged below 400 per year, whereas in the 1980s the number of incidents per year averaged well above 500. See Cronin, “Rethinking Sovereignty, 123–24 and 128.