Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

By Thomas Graham Jr.; Keith A. Hansen | Go to book overview

Epilogue

In early April 2009, President Obama announced significant new initiatives in dealing with WMD proliferation by nation states and terrorist groups. Moreover, the Obama administration essentially had its senior national security leadership in place, including Intelligence Community leaders: Admiral Dennis Blair as the Director of National Intelligence and Leon Panetta as Director of CIA. Meanwhile, the countries of primary proliferation concern continued on their former paths.

Iran. As reported in the New York Times (David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, New York Times, March 14, 2009, p. WK 1), in early March 2009 Israel reacted harshly to the February 2009 announcement by the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran had enriched uranium to reactor grade so as to possess enough fissile material, should a decision be made to enrich such uranium upwards to weapons-grade, for one nuclear weapon. The chief of Israeli military intelligence, Amos Yadlin, said in Jerusalem that Iran had “crossed the technological threshold” and that Iran's reaching “military nuclear capabilities” was “a matter of adapting its strategy to the target of manufacturing a nuclear bomb.” This alarmist reaction by Israel came about a year after Israel allegedly made a private, unsuccessful request to the Bush administration for bunker-busting bombs, the right to overfly Iraq, and refueling capabilities so that Israeli warplanes would be able to attack the principal Iranian uranium enrichment facility at Natanz.

However, there seemed to be serious differences between the United States and Israel as to how urgently to treat this threat. Israel declared that it wanted to see diplomacy with Iran begin promptly and to end “by late spring or early summer.” Otherwise, it was argued, the Iranians would simply drag on negotiations endlessly while continuing their nuclear weapon program. By contrast, the Obama administration was only planning to begin serious discussions after the Iranian presidential election in June. According to the New York Times report, the Intelligence Community estimated that Iran might have enough HEU for a nuclear weapon by the end of 2009, but more likely somewhere between 2010

-201-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
/ 300

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Author Advanced search

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.