The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974

By James Edward Miller | Go to book overview

EPILOGUE: THE ANDREAS ERA

Greece's century-and-a-half old habits as a client state of larger powers
and the congenital propensity of Greeks to reject what does not serve
their sense of personal and ethnic self-esteem, require foreign scapegoats
on occasions such as this: the CIA, Dr Kissinger, and the U.S. Sixth Fleet
qualified.

— Foreign and Colonial Office, November 1974

On August 5, 1974, Henry Kissinger addressed a meeting of disgruntled State Department officials and defended his handling of the Cyprus crisis. Dismissing “learned reports from the bowels of the Department” as inadequate to the task of warning him of the likelihood of an invasion, Kissinger insisted that his management of the Cyprus issue had defined “objectives that would retain United States control” and had adopted “tactics in which the United States would have maximum flexibility as the crisis developed.” These actions, Kissinger continued, had weakened the junta and created “maximum obstacles” to Turkish intervention. While “nothing could have stopped the Turks” from exploiting Greek “stupidity,” his diplomacy had secured the best of possible results: Karamanlis was in control in Athens, Greece and Turkey had avoided a general war, and a solution on Cyprus acceptable to all was possible. Kissinger concluded this triumphal recounting of his policy successes by assuring his listeners that “the test is going to be in negotiations that are starting next week.”1

The events of August 13–15 left Kissinger's diplomacy in tatters but not his self-confidence. Failure to preserve peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean, the secretary of state was soon explaining, was the responsibility of everyone except himself. He rewarded those junior State Department officials who had warned him of the dangers that his actions were creating with a systematic effort to destroy their careers. The secretary refused to provide Congress with the complete accounting of his actions and pointed the finger of blame for the Cyprus mess at the Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, which, after years of supinely accepting Nixon administration policies, finally nerved themselves to take back part of their constitutional role in the management of foreign affairs. Kissinger complained loudly about

-201-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Preface vii
  • Abbreviations in the Text xv
  • Introduction - Manifest Destiny Meets the Megali Idea 1
  • 1: The Greek Tar Baby, 1950–1953 23
  • 2: No Report from Cyprus is Ever Cheerful, 1950–1959 44
  • 3: The Right, 1953–1963 66
  • 4: Black Mak Cyprus, 1960–1964 84
  • 5: Coup D'état, 1964–1967 111
  • 6: The Andreas Version, 1967–1973 136
  • 7: Dancing with the Dictators, 1969–1974 157
  • 8: A Perfect Storm 1967–1974 176
  • Epilogue: The Andreas Era 201
  • Notes 213
  • Bibliography 281
  • Index 295
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this book
  • Bookmarks
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
/ 301

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.