Targeting Only the Leaders
The rhetoric surrounding international criminal prosecutions is ambitious and idealistic. The ICTY, for instance, was established to “put an end” to the crimes occurring in the former Yugoslavia and to “bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them,”125 while the ICC was created “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of [international] crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”126 The likelihood that the international tribunals can meet these, or even less-ambitious goals, is a topic for Chapter 3. This chapter sets the stage for that discussion by detailing the financial constraints impeding the prosecution of international crimes. The following sections—which examine the budgetary difficulties of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC, the hybrid international-domestic tribunals, and domestic criminal justice systems—will show that, given the large number of offenders and the use of criminal procedures that seek to incorporate due-process guarantees, neither international tribunals nor domestic criminal justice systems can hope to prosecute more than a very small proportion of international offenders.
The ICTY and ICTR began their institutional lives inauspiciously. It took more than a year for the Security Council to agree on a prosecutor for the ICTY, for instance, and understaffing at all levels plagued the ICTR for its first few years. A full year after it was created, the ICTR employed only five investigators and