1. Joel Brinkley, "Saudis Blame U.S. and Its Role in Iraq for Rise of Terror," New York Times, October 14, 2004.
2. Barry Schweid, "Saudi Plan for Muslim Forces Rejected," Associated Press, October 19, 2004.
3. Unless otherwise stated, the numbers for military manpower and equipment used in this report are adapted by the authors from the 2003–2004 and 2004–2005 editions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance (London: IISS).
4. Department of Defense, Iraq Weekly Status Report, November 3, 2004, and information provided from MNSTC-I.
5. U.S. State Department, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999–2000 (Washington, DC, 2000), p. 77
6. The counts of Iran's military manpower, weapons numbers and types, force strength, and defense expenditures in this report rely heavily on various editions of the IISS, Military Balance. These figures are taken from Military Balance, 2004– 2005, pp. 354–55.
7. U.S. State Department, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999–2000, p. 77.
8. Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfer to Developing Nations (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, CRS RL32547, August 26, 2004), pp. 50 and 61.
10. Adapted from EIA, "World Oil Transit Chokepoints," June 2004, http://www.eia. doe.gov/emeu/cabs/choke. html.
11. The Suez Canal is not seen as a threat to Saudi Arabia in this analysis. It is, however, a major choke point. The EIA notes that:
…some 3.8 million MMBD flowed through the Canal and Sumed Pipeline com-
plex in 2003. "Of this total, the Sumed Pipeline transported 2.5 million bbl/d of
oil northbound (nearly all from Saudi Arabia) and the Suez Canal about 13