Convergent Chinese and Indian
Perspectives on the Global Order
Most analyses of Sino-Indian relations, no matter how cursory or from which country of origin, invariably assume an underlying element of competitiveness if not downright rivalry.1 Within the specialist literature, the degree of Sino-Indian competition usually depends on how broadly the studies are cast. If the focus falls narrowly—as, for example, on the two countries' border dispute—then the competitive element becomes almost entirely dominant, lodged firmly within a bilateral security matrix.
Similarly, other studies comparing India and China—whether in ballistic missile or nuclear weapon development, in blue-water naval aspirations, in comparative diplomacy in Asia, in commercialization of technological competence, research and development spending, or even social welfare indicia—invariably carry a heavy assumption of rivalry as well. At the very least, their content conjures invidious comparisons between the two countries, with China generally faring better except, not surprisingly, in standards of democratic participation and (although India's counterinsurgen