A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991

By Vojtech Mastny; Malcolm Byrne | Go to book overview

Document No. 79: Czechoslovak Analysis of the
"Soiuz 77" Exercise, March 21–29, 1977

One of the themes that has become apparent with the recent availability of East European military files is that Warsaw Pact exercises often operated on fundamentally unrea- sonable assumptions. Thus, the 1977 "Soiuz" (Unity) exercise in Czechoslovakia and Hungary presumes, as usual, a NATO attack, this time making use of Austrian terri- tory. As early as the second day, the Warsaw Pact is already in a position to start a counter-offensive and push the enemy back. This is particularly surprising given the signals Soviet bloc intelligence was receiving about NATO's growing conventional and nuclear capabilities at the time. It also seems clear that the Soviet General Staff, in order to justify the Warsaw Pact's own offensive strategy, held fast to the ideological- ly conditioned basic premise that NATO would be the one to initiate hostilities.

According to the "Staff of the Unified Armed Forces Plan of Joint Measures for the Czechoslovak People's Army in the 1976–1977 Training Year" and the "Calendar Plan of the CzPA Measures in the 1976–1977 Training Year," an allied, unilateral, multi-level, strategic–operational command-staff exercise, "Soiuz 77", has been conducted on the territory of the People's Republic of Hungary and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic from March 21 to 29, 1977.

The staff of the Unified Armed Forces and operational staffs of the Hungarian People's Army, Soviet Army and the Czechoslovak People's Army under the command of Unified Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Supreme Commander Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov took part in the exercise. "…"

The exercising sides presumed that an armed conflict had been initiated by surprise on March 20 by the "Westerners" using conventional means of destruction while maintaining nuclear weapons in constant readiness for use.

The Central Army Group "…" prepared a major strike "…" in the direction of Regensburg, Tábor, Katowice with the task of destroying the "Easterners'" main grouping in the area of Karlovy Vary, Strakonice, Prague. "It intended" to fulfill the nearer assignment by reaching the Wrocław–Katowice–Lučenec line on the sixth or eighth day of the operation.

On the right wing, the main grouping of the Central Army Group "was" to attack by violating Austrian neutrality with the aim of striking in the direction of Brno, Ostrava, to come to the flank of the Central Front striking group and in cooperation with the major forces of the Central Army Group to encircle and destroy the "Easterners'" forces in the area of Bohemia and central Moravia.

The "Easterners:" were planning to fend off the aggression and go on the attack. The Central Front "…" prepared to fend off the "Westerners'" aggression and mount an offensive operation in the Prague–Stuttgart direction with the aim of destroying

-402-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this book
  • Bookmarks
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
/ 734

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.