A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991

By Vojtech Mastny; Malcolm Byrne | Go to book overview

Document No. 100: East German Summary of Warsaw
Pact Summit in Moscow, June 28, 1983
The main purpose of this Warsaw Pact leadership meeting in Moscow was to assess the impending introduction of Euromissiles—intermediate-range missiles intended to counter the same kind of missiles already deployed by the Soviet Union—which by now was regarded as all but certain. If the missiles were deployed, the Soviet Union would have to live up to its stated intention to walk out of the Geneva talks, the only still ongoing East–West arms control negotiations. Andropov's message to his col- leagues is that the Warsaw Pact must not allow the West to achieve military superior- ity through deployment of the new missiles. The question was what measures should be taken. Options ranged from deploying counter-missiles near the borders of Western countries that accepted Euromissiles to having individual Warsaw Pact member-states influence their NATO counterparts not to go ahead with the deployments. One con- clusion that can be drawn from the second proposal is that by this time Moscow had become more dependent on its allies than in previous decades."…"1. The Moscow meeting, which took place on initiative of the USSR half a year after the Prague session of the Political Consultative Committee of the states of the Warsaw Treaty, served:
to reassess the development of the international situation, particularly after the meeting at Williamsburg and the latest NATO meetings in Brussels and Paris;

"…"

to discuss the necessary military and political counter-measures of the Warsaw Treaty states in case of the deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Western Europe;
"…"3.a) The debate about the defense measures to be taken by the Warsaw Treaty states in case of the stationing of missiles in Western Europe took a central position. Cde. Andropov "…" reported, in addition to previous official Soviet statements, particularly the government declaration of May 28, 1983, that the USSR
refrains from its unilateral moratorium to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the Western part of the USSR;
also deploys wide range missiles;
is going to move Soviet tactical missiles closer to the borders of those NATO countries that deploy them.

Cde. Erich Honecker "…" explained the readiness of the GDR to make its territory available for stationing respective missile systems as a counter-weight to the planned "deployment of" U.S. nuclear weapons.

Cde. Husák remarked for the ČSSR (whose territory would also be affected) that it would actively contribute to the necessary measures. He explicitly supported the explanation of Cde. Erich Honecker.

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