The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model

By Jean-Jacques Laffont; David Martimort | Go to book overview

Subject Index
absolute risk aversion, 382–84
action space; cost of, 390–91; limits in, 387–91
actions, verifiability of, 350
adverse selection, 3–6, 19, 28–30; constraints and, 82–144; correlations, 95–96; hold-up problem and, 373–75; moral hazard and, 267–302; repetition of, 307–19
adverse selection canonical model, 31
agency costs, 266–68
agency model, 29
aggregate effort, 203
aggregate performances, 217–18
agrarian contracts, 219–23
agricultural contracts, 7–11
allocation rules, 49–50; monotonicity of, 242, 254–56
allocations, 30, 31, 40, 66
allocative distortions, 5, 266
allocative efficiency, 5, 29, 40; agency costs and, 266–68; improving, 267–68; increase in, 43; lack of, 47
Arrow-Debreu theory, 4
assets, ownership of, 224–26
asymmetric common value model, 27
asymmetric information, 4, 5, 25, 30, 33, 40; financial markets and, 75; informed principal and, 353–56; marginal costs and, 48; multidimensional, 93–100; optimal contract under, 41–43; theory of, 46–48; unions and, 76–81
asymmetric tasks, 215–17, 238–39
auctions, 8, 27
audit mechanisms, 121–30
audit technology, 122
auditing, 84–85
bang-bang incentives, 223
Baron-Myerson model, 105, 109
Bayes’ rule, 70, 344
Bayesian equilibrium, 5, 30, 51, 359, 360, 369
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, 5, 27, 51
behavior, 2, 391–94
benchmarking, 167
bidimensional asymmetric information, 94–95, 100
binding participation constraints, 229–30
Blackwell’s condition, 170–72
bounded rationality, 393
Brownian motion, 382, 384
budget constraints, 85, 233
bunching contracts, 38, 83, 89–90, 140–42
bypass technology, 106–7
CARA (constant absolute risk aversion), 230–32, 382–84
Central Limit Theorem, 340

-417-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Foreword xi
  • Introduction 1
  • 1 - Incentives in Economic Thought 7
  • 2 - The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off 28
  • 3 - Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection 82
  • 4 - Moral Hazard: the Basic Trade-Offs 145
  • 5 - Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard 187
  • 6 - Nonverifiability 240
  • 7 - Mixed Models 265
  • 8 - Dynamics under Full Commitment 303
  • 9 - Limits and Extensions 347
  • References 399
  • Author Index 413
  • Subject Index 417
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
/ 421

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Author Advanced search

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.