Campaigns and Operations
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and com-
mander have to make is to establish… the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither
mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first
of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. —Carl von Clausewitz, On War
This chapter describes considerations for designing counterinsurgency campaigns and operations. For Army forces, this chapter applies aspects of command and control doctrine and planning doctrine to counterinsurgency campaign planning. While campaign design is most often associated with a joint force command, all commanders and staffs need to understand it.
4-1. In chapter 1, insurgency is described as an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. Ultimately, the long-term objective for both sides in that struggle remains acceptance by the people of the state or region of the legitimacy of one side's claim to political power. The reason an insurgency forms to challenge the existing order is different in each case. The complexity of insurgency presents problems that have incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements. The solutions to these intensely challenging and complex problems are often difficult to