GIVEN THE DEBILITATING Link between transnational organized crime and transnational terrorism, the differentiated use by transnational criminal organizations of corruption tactics versus violence tactics, and the distinctive impact of transnational criminal activities on individual security versus state security, determining appropriate responses to this threat is not an easy task. Indeed, in the fight against illicit global cross-border transactions, observers generally agree that “governments are failing,” 1 “traditional diplomacy has little or no prospect of being effective,” 2 and few successful international controls exist.3 This pessimistic outlook is not due to regulators’ being uninformed or uncaring, and it cannot be remedied simply by enhancing their authority or by throwing more money at the problem. This chapter presents the security paradoxes surrounding effective management, the changes in orientation needed to overcome these challenges, and the concrete policy recommendations with a potential for effective management of transnational criminal threat.
Attempting to constrain effectively transboundary “transsovereign” problems faces difficult challenges. The reasons behind this predicament include the need for (1) state governments and the private sector to control or contain these problems without closing off economies, societies, or technologies; (2) cooperation and commitment among a great number of sometimes reluctant parties; (3) involvement of nonstate as well as state parties in any solution; (4) action taken by state governments to affect economic and social spheres “where the arm of liberal capitalist states has the shortest reach”;