1. Paul Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grand Strategy,” Security Studies 11, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 1–43.
2. Regarding the Fukuda Doctrine, see Sueo Sudo, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992). The so-called Yoshida Doctrine has been deduced by scholars such as Kenneth Pyle as encapsulating the defining hallmarks of Japan’s postwar grand strategy, characteristics they trace back to Yoshida. However, Yoshida never formally announced this strategy, much less suggested it as his own. See Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era, the Japanese Question [(Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1992): 25–26; and Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: The Century Foundation, 2007), ch. 8, esp. 405. Masashi Nishihara appears to have been the first to coin the term Yoshida Doctrine. See Nishihara, “How Much Longer the Fruits of the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’?” in Hahn Bae-ho and Yamamoto Tadashi, eds., Korea and Japan: A New Dialogue across the Channel (Seoul: Asia Research Center, Korea University): 150–167. The Yoshida Doctrine is an implicit grand strategy doctrine, whereas the Fukuda Doctrine is an explicit diplomatic doctrine.
3. Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror: Steady Incrementalism or Radical Leap?” CSGR Working Paper 104/02 (Center for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, University of Warwick: August 2002): 4.
4. Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Reemergence as a “Normal” Military Power, Adelphi Paper 368–9 (London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004): 131. Also see Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2009).
5. John Miller, “Japan Crosses the Rubicon?” Asia-Pacific Security Studies 1, no. 1, (January 2002): i—4. For a skeptical Japanese view of this claim, see Akio Watanabe,