BRAZIL AND INDIA: LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS AND
In chapter 2 I hypothesized that party-focused legislative rules on agenda-setting, amendments, and voting in a country should motivate party-focused lobbying by special interests whereas individual-focused rules should motivate individual-focused lobbying. In chapter 3, I discussed how case analysis using carefully selected cases could be used to test these theoretical predictions in the absence of large-n data on lobbying. Chapter 3 also discussed in detail the institutional configuration that qualified the two selected cases as theoretically appropriate—Brazil to represent the category of individual-focused legislative rules and India to represent the category of party-focused legislative rules. In this chapter I begin the theory testing process by testing the first set of hypotheses linking institutions to lobbying behaviors. Chapter 5 then tests the link between lobbying behavior and corruption.
Hypotheses H1a, H2a, and H3a in chapter 2 framed the causal mechanism that links specific legislative institutions to political corruption, that is, the behavior of business lobbies. Therefore, the first step in testing this two-step theoretical chain is to test whether business groups in Brazil and India respond to these legislative incentives by lobbying political parties in India and individual legislators in Brazil. There are two types of data that are needed to check these hypotheses. First, we need evidence that links institutional design to perceptions of political influence by business groups. Second, we need data that documents how groups strategize based on these perceptions, specifically how they choose their political venue. For this project, I collected and combined three types of evidence to answer these questions—group survey data, open-ended interviews, and analytical narratives of legislative bills.
To the best of my knowledge, the variables on venue choice are currently not available through an existing dataset for any set of countries. Therefore, to operationalize this variable, I collected data on venue choice and perceptions of institutional influence through a systematic survey of business interest groups conducted in 2005–2006 in India and Brazil. This survey provides data on 179 groups in India and 158 groups in