The physical mechanisms of mind, EXTENDED suggests, are simply not all in the head. Is this correct? To raise this question is not necessarily to doubt that heterogeneous mixes of neural, bodily, and environmental elements support much human problem-solving behavior or that understanding such coalitions matters for understanding human thought and reason. It is certainly important, for example, that we appreciate and learn how to analyze the role of epistemic actions in Tetris, of deictic pointers in visual problem solving, and even perhaps of Otto’s notebook in his decision making. But should we really count such actions and loops through nonbiological structure as genuine aspects of extended cognitive processes? In this chapter, I consider a range of worries whose starting points concern real or apparent differences between what the brain accomplishes and what the other elements in such problem-solving matrices provide.
Adams and Aizawa, in a series of recent and forthcoming papers (2001, in press-a, in press-b), seek to refute, or perhaps merely to terminally