The History of the European Union: Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950-72

By Wolfram Kaiser; Brigitte Leucht et al. | Go to book overview

4   Transatlantic policy networks
in the creation of the first
European anti-trust law
Mediating between American
anti-trust and German ordo-liberalism

Brigitte Leucht

One crucial dimension of the formation of the first integrated core Europe organization of six member-states at the Schuman Plan conference was the creation of a supranational European anti-trust law. Following the initiative of the French government to pool the coal and steel industries first of all of France and Germany under a supranational ‘joint high authority’, the delegations of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries from 20 June 1950 to 18 April 1951 held a multilateral conference in Paris. Adhering to their policy preference for an intergovernmental Europe, the British government in early June 1950 decided not to participate. The High Authority was created in 1952, after the six member-states had ratified the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The anti-trust provisions embodied in articles 65 and 66 of the treaty set a precedent for European Union competition policy. Next to mergers, state aids and public utility, anti-trust is one of the four separate areas constituting this key policy area. It comprises the scrutiny and control of cartels and restrictive practices and the abuse of a dominant market position.1 In this chapter, I will show how informal transatlantic policy networks of academics, civil servants and politicians shaped the anti-trust provisions of the ECSC treaty during the inter-state negotiations on the Schuman Plan.

The historiography of early European integration and of postwar transatlantic relations has focused on the governmental level of the negotiations. It has portrayed the Schuman Plan negotiations as a process of a multilateral bargaining by national governments.2 Domestically derived material and economic interests were driving the negotiation process among apparently cohesive state entities.3 Implicitly accepting the thesis of American empire building after 1945, the historiography of transatlantic relations has also introduced the notion of American influence on the creation of core Europe.4 Geir Lundestad in particular has made a strong case for the American empire, which he argues was an ‘empire by invitation’. Accordingly, the United States (US) government in their fight against Soviet communism supported efforts at European integration as the formation of a democratic and capitalist Western Europe within an Atlantic framework.5 Other works have highlighted the critical link between the Schuman Plan and the reorganization of the German heavy industries after the Second World War, which was a pre-requisite for the ECSC treaty.6 On the whole, however, historical literature

-56-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
The History of the European Union: Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950-72
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this book
  • Bookmarks
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
/ 228

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.