Closing Pandora's Box: Arms Races, Arms Control, and the History of the Cold War

By Patrick Glynn | Go to book overview

CHAPTER 2
The Munich Blunder

Much of the revolution in thinking about war now associated in our minds with the invention of the atomic bomb actually took shape in the years during and immediately following World War I. The unprecedented carnage of 1914 to 1918 strengthened the conviction in many hearts that war had ceased to be effective "as an instrument of national policy."1 In the 1920s and 1930s, it became commonplace to speak of the next war as threatening an end to civilization. The new technology of destruction--machine gun, tank, airplane, poison gas--promised unimaginable horrors should the calamity of world war be repeated. Air power, in particular--described in a manner closely resembling the way in which we now speak of nuclear weapons--was contemplated with growing apprehension. In the next war, it was predicted, bombers would quickly reduce whole cities to rubble; tens of thousands of civilians would perish from aerial gas attacks in a single day. "In war," affirmed British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in the late 1930s, echoing the prevailing views of his contemporaries, "them are no winners."2

World War I was widely thought to have discredited not merely a particular set of policies but the traditional approach to foreign policy. It was viewed as an indictment not simply of this or that government or foreign office but of the balance of power itself. To prevent another such catastrophe--a cataclysm that promised to be many times worse than the one just concluded--it would be necessary to reconstruct diplomacy on an entirely new foundation. The traditional mechanisms and expedients

-45-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Closing Pandora's Box: Arms Races, Arms Control, and the History of the Cold War
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Foreword ix
  • Acknowledgments xiii
  • Chapter 1 - The Sarajevo Fallacy 1
  • Chapter 2 - The Munich Blunder 45
  • Chapter 3 - Cold War, Atomic Peace 84
  • Chapter 4 - Debating the Absolute Weapon 123
  • Chapter 5 - Staying Out of Vietnam--The Logic of "Massive Retaliation" 138
  • Chapter 6 - The Cuban Cauldron 172
  • Chapter 7 - Limited Arms, Limited War 214
  • Chapter 8 - The Age of Arms Control 234
  • Chapter 9 - The New Morality 273
  • Chapter 10 - Tough Cop, Good Cop 306
  • Epilogue 361
  • Notes 371
  • Index 431
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
/ 448

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Author Advanced search

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.