Strategy after Deterrence

By Stephen J. Cimbala | Go to book overview

offenses for retaliation looks ghastly to anti-nuclear activists who have misunderstood the essential mission of nuclear weapons: to contribute to the avoidance of war, or to the quickest possible termination of it if deterrence fails. Dissuasion based on making war "winable" again may be in the cards, but not with nuclear weapons as the aces.


NOTES
1.
Excerpts from the president's speech of March 23, 1983, appear in Arms Control Association, Star Wars Quotes ( Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, 1986), Appendix.
2.
See Fred S. Hoffman, Study Director, Ballistic Missile Defenses and U.S. National Security, Summary Report, Prepared for the Future Security Strategy Study ( Washington, D.C.: October, 1983), and The Strategic Defense Initiative: Defensive Technologies Study ( Washington, D.C.: April, 1984).
3.
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard ( Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 358.
4.
Clausewitz, On War, 357.
5.
Clausewitz, On War, 357.
6.
Clausewitz, On War, 357.
7.
Clausewitz, On War, 363.
8.
Clausewitz, On War, 370.
9.
On dissuasion, see Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace ( Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), 190-207.
10.
The distinction between deterrence by denial and by punishment is explained in Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 3-16, 31, 33-40, 50. Pertinent excerpts appear in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy ( Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 56-76. Synder notes that the threat of denial action is likely to be appraised by the aggressor in terms of the deterrer's capabilities, while threats of punishment will be evaluated in terms of the defender's estimate of the aggressor's intentions. Thus, the threat of denial action, according to Snyder, is more credible on two counts: It is less costly for the deterrer to fulfill, and it may also prevent the attacker from making desired gains. Therefore, "While the making of a threat of nuclear punishment may be desirable and rational, its fulfillment is likely to seem irrational after the aggressor has committed his forces, since punishment alone may not be able to hold the territorial objective and will stimulate the aggressor to make counterreprisals." Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, 67.
11.
Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Uncertainties for the Soviet War Planner", International Security 7, no. 3 (Winter 1982- 1983): 139-66.
12.
Lambeth, "Uncertainties"157.
13.
Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente", Foreign Affairs 54 ( 1976): 207-33.
14.
Clausewitz, On War, 528
15.
Clausewitz, On War, 528.
16.
Clausewitz, On War, 370.

-216-

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