credits and investment from abroad. What could they do without them?
Popular mobilization, so dramatic at the time of the De Koning visit in July 1980, was no longer easy. Volkscomites, in some cases, achieved success
in communal projects and validated the idea that local government was long
overdue in this tiny but overcentralized society. Nevertheless, wayward
leadership at the top doomed any effort to maximize the talent and thrust of
local initiative. The only site of effective mobilization, it seemed, was in the
armed forces, where Bouterse brilliantly used political indoctrination--and
fear--to build solidarity. The ease of the Rambocus takeover of the barracks
came as a shock. Now Bouterse would devote considerable time and effort to
training and fraternizing with his men. He may have harbored romantic ideas
about joining the international ranks of populist revolutionaries. But, first and
last, he had to keep his grip on power, whatever might happen to the
Manifest van de revolutie ( Paramaribo: n.p., May 1, 1981), selection quoted
De Ware Tijd, Sept. 2, 1981.
This, in general, was the thrust of an address by a Jamaican bauxite union
leader to Surinamese government and army leaders in April 1981. De Ware Tijd, Apr.
OGEM was nationalized in June 1981, and the Surinamese Electric Company
became a wholly public enterprise in early 1982.
J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma
and Netherlands India ( New York: New York University Press, 1956), 306-07.
Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian
and African Peoples ( Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), 246.
De Ware Tijd, Aug. 29, 1981.
Ibid, Sept. 12, 1981. Horb was also singled out for criticism by radical
members of the press for his contacts with the commission.
Bram Behr, Terreur op Uitkijk: Over de moord op de landbouwer Mahes
( Paramaribo: Surinaamse Arbeiders Publikaties, 1981).