When my thoughts on military policy first began the subtle metamorphosis from scattered impressions to completed manuscript, one of my major concerns was the existence of a serious gap in American strategy. It was neither the bomber gap, the missile gap, nor any other hardware gap. Rather it was an intellectual and psychological gap, and it existed as a vast gulf between those whose professional concern was with armament policy and those whose concern was with disarmament policy. In government, in academic circles, and among the attentive public, the relationship between the armers and the disarmers was either non-existent or it was hostile. Moreover, this dichotomy of attitudes was widely reflected in our political and administrative structure and practice. Each set of policies was being made independently of the other by people with differing institutional loyalties, conflicting political views, and widely divergent technical skills. There was almost no communication or understanding, in or out of government, between the armers and the disarmers.
Now, two years later, the situation is slowly beginning to improve. Those of us who have taken arms control and disarmament