In opening our discussion of arms control, it might be best to emphasize at the very outset that here is a phrase which means many things to many men. Its meaning has ranged all the way from self-restraint in weapon deployment to supervision of weapons tests, and from increasing national armaments to their total elimination. In this study, we shall distinguish between arms control and the related concepts of deterrence and disarmament by applying it to any measures which nations take co-operatively (though not necessarily through formal negotiation) to enhance or preserve the stability of an international system short of the elimination of existing weapons. The crucial factors here are the psychological-perceptual, with much less emphasis on modifications in the existing weapon systems.
In Part I, our concern was primarily with the problem of deterring the adversary through the threat of massive reprisal. The question was one of providing the maximum in discouragement and disincentive to those who might be seriously con