In the previous chapter we attempted to examine the range of expectations and fears which emerge from the strategies and capabilities employed by each side in the cold war; the most salient conclusion reached was that each ends up with a very ambivalent attitude toward the first strike. If we were talking in terms of individual psychology, we would refer to this abstracted attitude as one of "avoidance-approach." Each side is afraid of launching the opening blow, but each is equally afraid of not launching it. Given that perceptual context, we found a variety of situations which could be expected to overcome the first half of the "set" and produce behavior conforming to the second half. If it is true that we have generated an environment which attaches a powerful incentive to getting in the preventive or pre-emptive strike, what possible measures might be introduced to diminish that incentive or to produce dis incentives?
In this chapter we shall explore some possibilities which may exist even while the quantitative and qualitative arms race continues; and in the next chapter, our concern will be with measures involving certain restraints on that competition in