have fomented uprisings. In this environment the pressures against income concentration that have resulted from Colombia's democratic forms have not been strong enough to produce a distribution of income nearly as egalitarian as those of authoritarian systems like Korea and Taiwan, although it does seem to be the case that within the Latin American context, the typically democratic regimes have had somewhat less inequality than ones (like Brazil and Peru) that have more often been under military rule.
However, some of the economic elements that have contributed to the stability of the political system in the past have disappeared or weakened. The illegal nature of the booming drug industry lowers the citizenry's respect for the law, raises the expectations of quick wealth, and slows the growth of the modern sector engaged in the production of internationally tradeable goods. The growth of mineral exports controlled by the government is likely to strengthen and embitter the fight for the government's spoils and the rents and privileges it can create. The increased open urban unemployment, particularly among collegeeducated individuals with high income expectations, is another factor likely to contribute to increased social tension and to put stress on the political system. Thus, it is possible that Colombia, following O'Donnell's suggested stages, 30 may be entering a period in which the modernization process slows down after substantial success, economic groups are already well organized and active, social tensions increase, and political repression becomes more likely. This scenario, considered possible but unlikely by Sheahan in 1980, 31 is now unfortunately a more serious threat for the near future.
The authors wish to thank Mr. Sergio Uribe for comments on a previous version of this chapter and Mrs. Martha Rountree for her efficient and always cheerful typing assistance.