Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: The Sword or the Olive Branch?

By Thomas R. Mockaitis | Go to book overview

3
Somalia

If the Cold War placed severe limits on both the number and the nature of UN operations, the end of that war seemed to open endless possibilities for intervention. In November 1989, the Berlin Wall came down, and one by one the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe fell like the proverbial row of dominoes. Finally, during the summer of 1991, the Soviet Union itself broke apart, freeing most of its satellites and many of its component republics. The thaw broke the logjam in the Security Council, but the immediate beneficiary of the change was not peacekeeping. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in the summer of 1990, the council approved a collective security operation unseen since the Korean War forty years earlier. Although Operation Desert Storm was UN-sanctioned but not UN-led, it would certainly have met with a Soviet veto perhaps as little as a year earlier. Now the Russian Federation, heir to the Soviet Union's council seat and veto, posed no objection, and the last red giant, China, refused to play the role of spoiler.

Where enforcement went, peacekeeping followed. The end of the Gulf War produced a civil crisis in Iraq itself as the defeated dictator reasserted control of the Shi'ia population of the south and the Kurds of the north. The latter posed a particularly thorny problem for the international community. Kurdistan overlaps northern Iraq, northeastern Syria, southeastern Turkey, and northwestern Iran. Hussein's repression of a rebellion by the Iraqi Kurds thus threatened to disrupt the entire region as 1.5 million refugees poured over the borders of Iraq and Turkey.

To avert a humanitarian nightmare, the United States and its Gulf War allies mounted Operation "Provide Comfort." They declared a safe haven in northern Iraq protected by a no-fly zone and 8,000 combat troops. 1 Massive humanitarian aid shipments sustained the refugees until they could be safely repatriated, and the infrastructure of their homeland rebuilt. The relief effort immediately drew in the

-47-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: The Sword or the Olive Branch?
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • What is to Be Done? ix
  • 1: Holding the Ring or Entering the Fray? 1
  • Notes 8
  • 2 - The Congo 11
  • Notes 43
  • 3 - Somalia 47
  • Notes 73
  • 4 - The Former Yugoslavia 79
  • Notes 119
  • 5 - Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: Toward a New Paradigm 125
  • Notes 141
  • Appendix: Maps 145
  • Bibliography 153
  • Index 163
  • About the Author *
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
/ 166

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.