January 1996. The Russian Duma held back on ratification and an effort was
made to link a planned Clinton-Yeltsin meeting in 1998 to ratification. At the
Helsinki summit meeting in 1997, Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that START III
would follow Duma ratification of START II.
In an effort to put pressure on the Duma, which was dominated by a coalition
of nationalists and Communists, the Congress had forbidden unilateral Amercan
cuts. The cost of not making the cuts mounted to the hundreds of millions, and
the Pentagon submitted to Congress a set of propasals for reducing the arsenal
unilaterally. By the end of 1998, Russia's economic troubles finally persuaded the
Duma to take up the treaty. But if the Duma continued to stall, the Pentagon
was determined to take action, if only to modernize its forces.
On arms control and disarmament, see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of
SALT ( New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973); Ralph E. Lapp, Arms Beyond
Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Technology ( Chicago: Cowles, 1970); Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience ( Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, for the RAND Corporation, 1979); Strobe Talbot, Endgame ( New York: Harper & Row, 1979); Strobe Talbot, Deadly Gambits ( New York: Knopf, 1984); Alan Platt, The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms
Policy, 1969-1977 ( Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978); Michael Krepon, Strategic
Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in American Politics ( New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1984); Paul Huth and
Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from
1900 to 1980", World Politics ( July 1984); and Chihiro Hosoya, "Miscalculations in
Deterrence Policy: Japanese-U.S. Relations, 1938-41", Journal of Peace Research ( 1968).
Jerome B. Wiesner, "The Glory and the Tragedy of the Partial Test Ban", The
New York Times, 11 April 1988.
This section draws especially on Wolfe, SALT Experience.