From Nuclear Military Strategy to a World without War: A History and a Proposal

By Roger Hilsman | Go to book overview

Unlike national forces, these U.N. forces could be trained and equipped only for defensive operations, thus removing the temptation of commanders to preempt a threat by attacking first. There undoubtedly will be situations in which offensive forces are needed, but that need can be met by having one or two of the U.N. units equipped and trained for offensive operations. These can be held as a sort of reserve to be introduced into a particular situation when it becomes clear that the U.N. forces trained and equipped for defense only are in trouble.

In any case, a U.N. force specially trained for the peculiar needs of peacekeeping will be much better suited for the task than national forces. National forces intervening on behalf of the United Nations are under constant political pressures both to serve national goals and to be withdrawn entirely when casualties mount. A U.N. foreign legion of professionals would undoubtedly experience some political pressures from the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly, but it would be free from these particular ones.


NOTES
1
A useful rundown of the U.N. experience and problems with peacekeeping is Mats R. Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping? ( London: Brassey's, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993). See also John Hillen, Blue Helmets: The Strategy of U.N. Military Operations ( Arlington, Va.: Brassey's, 1997).
2
The following list of the forty-six interventions was drawn from the official U.N. account, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, 3d ed. ( U.N. Department of Public Information, 1996).

U.N. Truce Supervision Organization ( UNTSO), 1948 to present. Established to help in supervising the truce in Palestine, it also supervises the General Armistice Agreements of 1949. Emergency Force ( UNEF I), November 1956-June 1967. Established following the 1956 invasion of Suez by France, Great Britain, and Israel to serve as a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces and to supervise cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of French, Israeli, and British troops from Egyptian territory. U.N. Emergency Force II ( UNEF II), October 1973-July 1979. Established in 1973 following the attack by Egypt across the Suez and by Syria on the Golan Heights to supervise the cease-fire between Egypt and Israel. U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), June 1974 to present. Established to supervise the cease-fire in the Golan Heights and the disengagement of the Israeli and Syrian forces. U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), March 1978 to present. Following a commando raid that killed thirty-seven Israelis, Israel invaded Lebanon and occupied a large region. UNIFIL was established to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces and monitor the cease fire. In 1983, the situation worsened and the United States sent a force of Marines to help. As described in Chapter 22, an Arab fanatic drove a truck loaded with explosives into their barracks, and 241 were killed. The purpose of both the original U.N. intervention and the American participation in 1983 was to forestall a war between Israel and Syria that seemed to have the potential for escalating to engulf the whole of the Middle East. A U.N. force of over 5 thousand men is still there. U.N. Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), June 1958-December 1958. In 1958 the Lebanese government complained that the United Arab Republic, the temporary union of Egypt and Syria, was intervening in Lebanon's internal affairs. The mission of UNOGIL was to ensure that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or arms into Lebanon.

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From Nuclear Military Strategy to a World without War: A History and a Proposal
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Preface ix
  • Notes xiv
  • Acknowledgments xv
  • Part I - The First Attempts at Nuclear Strategy 1
  • Chapter 1 - The Manhattan Project and Early Strategic Thinking 3
  • Notes 14
  • Chapter 2 - Nuclear Strategy and the Attack on Korea 16
  • Notes 27
  • Chapter 3 - New Look, Massive Retaliation, and Flexible Response 28
  • Notes 39
  • Chapter 4 - The H-Bomb and the Balance of Terror 40
  • Notes 47
  • Chapter 5 - The Debate on Nuclear Strategy 49
  • Notes 55
  • Part II - The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Case Study of Nuclear Strategy 57
  • Chpter 6 - The Crisis 59
  • Notes 70
  • Chapter 7 - The Significance 71
  • Note 77
  • Chapter 8 - McNamara II, the Schlesinger Doctrine, and Star Wars 81
  • Notes 94
  • Chapter 9 - No First Use, Counterforce, and Mad as a Strategy 95
  • Notes 103
  • Chapter 10 - The Breakup of the Soviet Union and the Bush -- Yeltsin Agreement 105
  • Notes 113
  • Part IV - The World Turned Upside Down 115
  • A Chapter 11 - Developments in Weapons 117
  • Notes 122
  • Chapter 12 - The Members of the Nuclear Club and Their Arms 123
  • Notes 138
  • Chapter 13 - Soviet, Chinese, and European Nuclear Strategy 139
  • Notes 147
  • Chapter 14 - Armageddon: Six Scenarios of Nuclear War 148
  • Notes 163
  • Part V - Arms Control and Disarmament 165
  • Chapter 15 - The History of Arms Control 167
  • Notes 179
  • Chapter 16 - The Prospects for Arms Control 180
  • Notes 186
  • Part VI - Why War? 187
  • Chapter 17 - The Social and Political Functions of War 189
  • Chapter 18 - Nationalism 198
  • Notes 210
  • Chapter 19 - A World Political Process Without World Government? 211
  • Notes 225
  • Chapter 20 - A Curious Creature 227
  • Notes 230
  • Part VII - Conclusions 231
  • Chapter 21 - A Long-Term Solution, a Medium-Term Compromise, and a Short-Term Stopgap 233
  • Chapter 22 - The Lessons of the "Small Wars" Since World War II 238
  • Notes 256
  • Chapter 23 - Humanitarian and Peacekeeping Forces 259
  • Notes 274
  • Chapter 24 - Conventional Forces for the Medium-Term Compromise 278
  • Notes 290
  • Chapter 25 - Nuclear Forces for the Short- Term Stopgap 291
  • Notes 304
  • Index 305
  • About the Author *
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