Central and Southeastern Europe in Transition: Perspectives on Success and Failure since 1989

By Hall Gardner | Go to book overview

successfully engage in such an ambitious mission without ultimately overextending its resources and undermining its political consensus and legitimacy will largely determine whether the peace of the Euro-Atlantic community can be sustained well into the new millennium.


NOTES
1.
See arguments of Jürgen Habermas, The Past as Future, translated and edited by Max Penskyi ( Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 45-54.
2.
French proposals were largely killed in 1945 when Moscow proposed that Soviet troops be deployed in each region of a proposed German confederation; George Kennan's post-World War II "Plan A" for German unification never saw the light of day once it was leaked to the press. The 1947 conference of German Länder ended with a walkout of pro-Soviet East German states.
3.
Günter Grass, "Short Speech by a Rootless Cosmopolitan," Two States-One Nation? ( New York: Harcourt Brace, Jovanovich, 1990), 5. See also Günter Grass, "Don't Reunify Germany," When the Wall Came Down: Reaction to German Unification, eds. Harold James and Maria Stone ( London: Routledge, 1992), 59.
4.
See my argument in Surviving the Millennium: American Global Strategy, the Collapse of the Soviet Empire, and the Question of Peace ( Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994); Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia, and the Future of NATO ( Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997).
5.
Hannes Adomeit, "Gorbachev and German Unification," Problems of Communism, 39 ( July-August 1990).
6.
In 1982, Ronald Reagan is said to have proposed Soviet membership in NATO at a North Atlantic Council meeting, shocking German officials in particular, who wondered if the president was serious. See also Ira Straus, "Russia-in-NATO," Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATOhttp://www.fas.org/man/nato/ ceern/index.html.
7.
George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed ( New York: Random House, 1998), 146.
8.
The 3 October 1990 Japan Times drew the lesson: "Observing Germany's trauma has made us determined that the 'northern territories,' which have been under Soviet occupation since 1945, be very soon once again part of the nation." James and Stone, When the Wall Came Down, 347.
9.
James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy ( New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1995), 86.
10.
Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 232.
11.
Philip Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice, Germany United and Europe Transformed ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 344, 473 fn.
12.
See Andrei Gratchev, "La Russie à la recherche d'une politique étrangère," Relations internationales: les Études de la Documentation Française, La Russie 1995- 1996. ( Paris: La Documentation Française, 1996).
13.
Amy Knight, Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). Knight has argued that the alleged coup attempt was really botched effort by Gorbachev to prevent the dissolution of the empire by declaring a national emergency. In Knight's account, Gorbachev calls President George Bush to warn him of the coup. Seymour Hersh, however, argues that U.S. intelligence knew of the coup and illegally shared U.S. intelligence intercepts with Yeltsin, President Bush then called Gorbachev to warn him. Yet if U.S. intelligence was as good as Hersh claimed, did Washington know that the coup had really been

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Central and Southeastern Europe in Transition: Perspectives on Success and Failure since 1989
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Foreword vii
  • Acknowledgments xi
  • Introduction 1
  • Chapter 1 in Search of East-Central Europe: Ten Years After 5
  • Notes 19
  • Chapter 2 the Balkans: A Distorted, Third World Reflection of Europe 21
  • Notes 28
  • Chapter 3 Rusty Ottoman Keys to the Balkans of Today 31
  • Notes 42
  • Chapter 4 the Role of Culture Under the Communist and Post-Communist Eras 43
  • Chapter 5 the Transformation of the Media in Post-Communist Central Europe 51
  • Notes 60
  • Chapter 6 the Media in Transition in Southern Central Europe 61
  • Notes 73
  • Chapter 7 a Balance of Economic Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe 75
  • Notes 92
  • Chapter 8 Ulysses and the Lotus Eaters 97
  • Notes 110
  • Chapter 9 Environmental Security and Civil Society 113
  • Notes 142
  • Chapter 10 the Genesis of Nato Enlargement and of War "Over" Kosovo 151
  • Introduction 151
  • Notes 181
  • Name Index 199
  • Subject Index 203
  • Contributors and Editors 209
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