surance plan that neither the president, the Senate-sponsor of the bill, nor the bankers desired, and it laid the foundation for far-reaching changes in American banking.
In an address to the New York State Bankers Association, Adolf Berle, a presidential adviser, stressed that the Glass- Steagall Act would only be regarded as a "bridge or a transition rather than as a permanent solution for the situation." He called upon the bankers as a group "to give some evidence of desiring to improve the system as a whole rather than furthering their own particular interests. 55 For their part bankers continued to debate the question of bank reform legislation. Their immediate concern was the plan for deposit insurance. As the future unfolded, their efforts would effect the postponement of the plan and would bring about readjustments in the assessments levied on the banks. But in time this fight would lose its force and banker opposition would center on the broader issues of monetary management and credit control. Designed as remedial legislation and born in the throes of the depression, the Banking Act of 1933 left much to be desired. Neither the administration nor the banking community was satisfied with its accomplishments. In the period that lay ahead, both would reconsider banking legislation and plans would evolve to provide for a fuller solution to the banking problems in the United States.