banks, getting them going again as soon as responsible management could be secured. It was obvious that confidence in resumed operations would be hard to establish. The banks would be the same banks, the bankers the same bankers. Some, however, would not be allowed to reopen. There must be tests for resumption that would prove the safety of those institutions that did resume. When activity had been set going again and panic had been quieted, it might be possible to achieve substantial reforms. The pressure of the present, however, called imperatively for simple restoration of a system people understood under conditions that would assure them of future safety. 38
With unwavering faith in the American system and in his own ability to surmount the crisis, Franklin Roosevelt had brought the nation through the bank emergency. Neither the Emergency Banking Act nor the Banking Act of 1933 was intrinsically related to a New Deal program. One was born of necessity, the other of compromise. Nevertheless, the president's control of the situation set the course for greater government participation in banking. The development of a Roosevelt banking program lay in the future.