The Person as a Self
B Y JAMES MARK BALDWIN
IF it be true, as much evidence goes to show, that what the person thinks of as himself is a pole or terminus at one end of an opposition in the sense of personality generally, and that the other pole or terminus is the thought he has of the other person, the "alter," then it is impossible to isolate his thought of himself at any time and say that in thinking of himself he is not essentially thinking of the alter also. What he calls himself now is in large measure an incorporation of elements that, at an earlier period of his thought of personality, he called some one else. The acts now possible to himself, and so used by him to describe himself in thought to himself, were formerly only possible to the other; but by imitating that other he has brought them over to the opposite pole, and found them applicable, with a richer meaning and a modified value, as true predicates of himself also. If he thinks of himself in any particular past time, he can single out what was then he, as opposed to what has since become he; and the residue, the part of him that has since become he, that was then only thought of--if it was thought of as an attribute of personality at all--as attaching to some one with whom he was acquainted.
So the truth we now learn is this: that very many of the particular____________________