Maintaining NATO

By Kaiser, Karl | Harvard International Review, Spring 2005 | Go to article overview

Maintaining NATO


Kaiser, Karl, Harvard International Review


NATO was fortunate to have two particularly gifted Secretaries General at moments of historic change for the international community. At the end of the Cold War the German Manfred Woerner creatively succeeded in adapting the Alliance to the disappearance of the East-West conflict that had previously dominated international geopolitics. After September 11, 2001, with the Iraq War to follow, Lord George Robertson from Great Britain skillfully held the Alliance together despite the divisions created by the administration of US President George W. Bush and the disagreements on the Iraq War. Lord Roberton also assisted NATO in adapting to new goals and policies.

Lord Robertson's analysis ("The Future of NATO," Fall 2004) correctly delineates the future tasks of NATO in a fundamentally unstable world, ranging from political convulsions in the adjacent world regions to jihad-terrorism, failed states, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As he points out, NATO has succeeded in fulfilling completely new tasks: ending ethnic cleansing with military force in Kosovo, keeping the peace by maintaining a military presence in the Balkans, supporting stability in Afghanistan through various mechanisms, and helping Poland's military involvement in the Iraq War by providing command infrastructure support which the country itself was unable to provide.

But Lord Robertson remains diplomatically silent on NATO's most important structural problem that it has faced in the recent past and will likely continue to confront: the tendency of the Bush Administration to bypass the Alliance or to treat it as a handy "tool box" from which to select "coalitions of the willing" to support Washington. Despite many of NATO's accomplishments, the organization has often been relegated to the sidelines by the Bush Administration's statements and actions.

When, as Lord Robertson put it, NATO "spectacularly proved its enduring relevance on September 12, 2001, when Article 5, the collective defense clause ... was invoked," the absence of a proper US response immediately demonstrated what has basically remained an ongoing problem. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited article

Maintaining NATO
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Author Advanced search

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.