Staffing Alone: Unilateral Action and the Politicization of the Executive Office of the President, 1988-2004

By Lewis, David E. | Presidential Studies Quarterly, September 2005 | Go to article overview

Staffing Alone: Unilateral Action and the Politicization of the Executive Office of the President, 1988-2004


Lewis, David E., Presidential Studies Quarterly


There is a burgeoning literature on unilateral action (see, e.g., Cooper 2002; Howell 2003; Mayer 2001). This literature frequently assumes that once orders are written, they are implemented without difficulty. As students of the policy process know, however, implementation post-enactment can be the key to determining whether policies succeed or fail (Pressman and Wildavsky 1974). There is often a significant slippage between what presidents or Congress intended and actual policy outcomes. Slippage can occur for a variety of reasons including resource constraints, difficulty observing outcomes, the complexity of joint action, and task difficulty. Importantly, bureaucratic resistance in implementation can also influence implementation.

In trying to ensure successful implementation of policy objectives, unilateral action once again comes into play. Presidents have significant unilateral influence over whether the managers who implement policies are chosen by the president or filled by the merit system. Presidential choices about whether federal managers will be appointees or career civil servants not only have significant consequences for the policy content of the measures enacted, but also the competence with which they are implemented (Gilmour and Lewis, forthcoming; Heclo 1975, 1977).

Presidents are frequently criticized for "politicizing" some part of the institutional presidency, from the national security bureaucracy to the budgetary process to environmental reports. (1) Implicit in these criticisms is the claim that presidential attempts to secure ideological fealty fundamentally damage the target of their attention. The National Security Council (NSC) staff fall victim to groupthink, the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) economic forecasts become less reliable, or Council on Environmental Quality reports are widely perceived as biased or vacuous. In many cases, the harm to agency neutrality and competence hurts not only the agency but also seemingly the president himself. Given the potential harm to the agency and the president, when is it in the president's interest to politicize agencies in the institutional presidency? This is an important topic given that we cannot understand the modern presidency apart from the institutional structures that have grown up around the persons who fill the office. We cannot understand national security policy without an understanding of the NSC and its staff. We cannot understand the president's role in the budgetary process or environmental policy without an understanding of his relationship with the Office of Management and Budget and the Council on Environmental Quality.

Thus, the power to determine the number of appointed positions is an understudied and important aspect of presidential unilateral power. In this article, I will describe the mechanics of how presidents alter the number of political appointees and explain why this is important for politics. I look specifically at the agencies in the Executive Office of the President (EOP). The article is divided into five sections. In the first section I describe what we know about politicization in the EOP. In the second section I describe the mechanics of how politicization occurs and in the third section I explain when presidents want to politicize. In the fourth and fifth sections of the article I examine politicization in the EOP with new data from the Office of Personnel Management and discuss what I find.

The EOP and Politicization

The EOP, created in 1939, is the structural basis of the institutional presidency. It comprises a system of presidential agencies created primarily to help the president perform congressionally delegated or constitutional responsibilities. Currently there are eleven agencies in the EOP. (2) They vary from agencies such as the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to the Council of Economic Advisers or the Office of Homeland Security. Some agencies in the EOP such as the OMB have a long history, established routines, professional expert staff, and substantial institutional memory that carries over from one administration to the next. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited article

Staffing Alone: Unilateral Action and the Politicization of the Executive Office of the President, 1988-2004
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.