GeorgiaGain or GeorgiaLoss? the Great Experiment in State Civil Service Reform

By Sanders, Robert M. | Public Personnel Management, Summer 2004 | Go to article overview

GeorgiaGain or GeorgiaLoss? the Great Experiment in State Civil Service Reform


Sanders, Robert M., Public Personnel Management


After guiding Georgia through several successful yet controversial reforms as governor, Senator Zell Miller enacted his greatest change by reorganizing the state's personnel system. The overhaul, entitled "GeorgiaGain," immediately created the most dramatic reforms in state public service since the Pendleton Act of 1883. Georgia would become the only state to dismantle its civil service and create a totally unclassified labor force hired through a decentralized personnel structure. Through the new program, many traditional employee protections were eliminated, with salaries determined by revised evaluations and a pay-for-performance system. State officials assert that efficiency has improved. Findings indicate that the largest raises have been given only to employees rated as outstanding, while the amount of "habitual" outstanding annual evaluations has decreased. Pay increases across the board also decreased, and more inadequate workers have departed since reform. However, overall, all types of employees have resigned in greater numbers each year, with the majority being the average employee, even though average workers received the greatest number of promotions. Survey findings illustrate that many state workers have also challenged GeorgiaGain's claims of enhanced evaluations, compensation and productivity.

A Novel Approach Toward State Merit Service

In 1996 Senator Zell Miller, then governor of Georgia, sought to leave another legacy from his popular administration, in this case, a restructuring of the state's merit service system. Miller hoped for a bureaucracy that would motivate, reward and retain high-quality public employees. The reorganization was predicated on the notion that management and employees were jointly responsible for optimum job performance. While focusing on a new performance compensation system, the governor sought to re-engineer job classifications and other state personnel processes. In his first State of the State address, Miller promised to revise the 53 year-old system, claiming it had gone from a solution to a problem. Job vacancies were taking up to two months to fill, and because of massive paperwork and a lengthy appeals process, the state was taking between 12 and 18 months to dismiss employees performing poorly. Miller was particularly concerned with the lack of training given to supervisors and managers in the use of the existing performance evaluation system.

Skillful in directing the Georgia legislature through many reforms (including his successful Lottery for Education program), Act 816, "Merit System Reform," was enacted, the most significant change in the state's personnel system since its inception. It was also the most epic public personnel restructuring in the United States since President Carter's federal Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. (1)

Through his Merit System Reform, Miller emphasized the politically popular notion that state government would operate in the same manner as private business.

Improving the productivity of the state's workforce would be goal number one. This overhaul, named "GeorgiaGain," focused on a pay-for-performance system. Agency efficiency would increase as low-performing employees would be identified and retrained. The Merit System would manage public employees, affording all new hires no civil service protections. Instead, they would be placed in an "employment at will" status after the probationary period. Over time, as those in the protected class retired or left, all agency positions would be unprotected. Georgia was now the only state to completely dismantle its civil service framework.

The Governor's GeorgiaGain Task Force was charged with recommending changes in job classifications, while the state Merit System and various agencies' human resource offices would implement the policy. The role of the Merit System would change from enforcer of civil service rules and regulations to "advisor" in support of agency-directed personnel programs. The Merit System would administer benefits and consult with the agencies in the areas of data management, payroll, salary assessment, position classification and training. Agencies would control recruitment and selection, as well as termination, which would become easier and faster. The agencies would also be responsible for providing due process in the event of a termination, as well as enforcing all existing anti-discrimination laws and statutes prohibiting partisan politics in the workplace.

The task force first recommended that "annual merit increases," perceived around the state as automatic, be eliminated. Instead, raises would be granted to employees in an equitable manner, based on performances that warranted recognition and reward. All workers would be rated on a four-point scale. Ironically, most state employees received no raises in the first two years of the governor's administration. During that time, there was also a major reduction in the workforce; thousands of state employees were laid off. Miller was confident that any challenges to his performance-based system would fail, based on Georgia's poorly maintained Civil Service System, which according to the Governor was protective of less productive employees. (2)

In 1996, after three years of preparation, seminars were presented to most of the state's managers and supervisors regarding the implementation of the reform's "Performance Management Process." Agency leaders would learn to set goals, targets for improved performance and standards for client service in the revised and expanded evaluation process. They would incorporate the new job titles and broader pay ranges in the system. Also, outstanding workers would be recruited and their training would be improved. (3)

Shafritz, et al. (4) indicate that this new system is becoming a model for the analysis of decentralized personnel authority. The number of "unclassified personnel" is rising quickly (35 percent in 2001, up from 17 percent in 1994). By 2006, 90 percent of Georgia's workforce will be "at will."

State Reform and Worker Satisfaction

In 1997, Georgia's Local 1985 of the Service Employees International Union cited low morale among state workers as a result of the implementation of GeorgiaGain. The union still contends that the program's revised structure supports the state's increased dependence on temporary workers, rising health insurance premiums, high turnover and below-market salaries. (5)

In 2000, Edward Kellough, et al. (6) conducted a survey for the Georgia Merit System Commissioner's Office examining state workers' perceptions of their work environment since reform. Four hundred and fifty-two supervisors and 2,542 line personnel responded to replicated questions from a Merit System survey administered in 1993 prior to the advent of the program. (7)

Table 1 denotes that, while an overwhelming majority of respondents indicated satisfaction with their job (Question 1), there was a 4 percent decline in the percentage over a seven-year period. In similar fashion, there were even more significant decreases in the number of persons: (a) finding performance appraisal discussions useful (Question 4); Co) understanding how a supervisor evaluated their performance (Question 5); and (c) believing that performance appraisals are conducted fairly (Question 7), indicating waning confidence in the appraisal process, a major component of GeorgiaGain's intent to improve performance and to compensate workers in an equitable manner. Additionally, there were declines in the number of employees: (a) believing that they knew what was expected of them (Question 3); (b) believing that their job description provided necessary information in regard to job standards and expectations (Question 6); (c) believing that the state offered enough training for them to grow and develop (Question 8); and (d) believing that one's work unit had high performance expectations (Question 9). Therefore, it is not surprising that there was an 8.5 percent increase in the number of workers indicating that they were seeking employment elsewhere (Question 2).

The study included an additional survey observing worker morale affected by GeorgiaGain. (See Appendix A.) Regarding the important issue of job satisfaction, over 70 percent described their agencies as "good places to work." However, most employees observed "a lot of turnover" in their work units, while also believing that "management did not appreciate their work." They expressed unhappiness with their pay and believed that morale in their respective work units was low.

In the area of worker trust and confidence in upper management, a majority felt that there were "quotas" on the number of "adequate" ratings available to employees. A majority also indicated that office politics influenced evaluations more than actual work performance, and that budgetary constraints limited a worker's chance of achieving an "outstanding" rating. Only about half of the respondents felt that their evaluations accurately reflected their work or were helpful in determining career development needs. A majority also stated that it was important to document one's own performance and that there was too much paperwork involved in the evaluation process.

Strikingly, a substantial majority believed that the pay-for-performance system established by GeorgiaGain was a poor way to motivate employees, and that it was never properly administered. They observed a waning commitment to the program by management. They also reported that the program was merely a way to cut payroll costs and to "squeeze" more work out of employees. Furthermore, they complained that 1) state pay was not based on how well a worker performs, 2) too much emphasis was placed on pay and not on other areas of motivation, and 3) that favoritism was a problem in regard to compensation. They also stated that state money was not available to reward outstanding employees or to provide for career advancement, and that lack of pay raises were due to problems with the program, not a result of employees reaching the ceiling of their pay range. They also observed conflict in their work units over annual pay. Additionally, few believed that state salaries were competitive with the private sector or that supervisors provided adequate training and teaching. Most also agreed it was difficult for the state to recruit qualified applicants.

The last component of the survey observed employee feelings about Georgia's Civil Service Reform Act. Few believed that the Act led to the hiring of highly qualified employees in a timely manner, or that the program created an effective human resource system. Only a slight minority declared that reform created more efficient and responsive employees. A large majority did feel that the Act made the firing process easier, yet they believed that it was still difficult to remove ineffective workers due to traditional procedural delays. Employees also rejected the notion that unclassified employees were better workers or easier to supervise. They also stated that the Act created less job security for all employees (classified and unclassified), and that transferring to an unclassified position was "risky." Finally, there existed a strong belief that supervisory personnel did not properly communicate the provisions and purposes of the Act to the workers and that agency personnel practices have not changed significantly under GeorgiaGain.

A majority did agree, however, that performance evaluations were helpful in identifying employee weaknesses and that excellent workers generally earned pay increases greater than those obtained by average performers. They also declared that one's political beliefs had no bearing on any management decision not to promote or reward an employee.

Indicators of Performance

In 2000 the Georgia Merit System commissioned a report regarding the impact of GeorgiaGain on personnel activity. (8) Data reveals that before reform, from 1993 to 1995, only 33 employees a year, on average (less than 1 percent of those appraised), "failed to meet expectations" on their job evaluations while an average of 601 (about 1 percent) "met expectations." There were 26,667 employees (44 percent) who "exceeded expectations' each year and 33,593 (55 percent) whose annual performance "far exceeded expectations." After the program began in 1996 to 1999, the amount of employees receiving evaluations rose by over 25 percent. Subsequently, a yearly average of 545 workers (<1 percent) "did not met expectations" (score #1), while 64,866 (85 percent) "met expectations" (#2). Those who "exceeded expectations" (#3) averaged 8,584 (11 percent), and 693 (about 1 percent) "far exceeded expectations" annually (#4).

The preceding data indicates that reform may have, indeed, created a more stringent appraisal process. While the percentage of workers receiving poor ("failed to meet expectations") performance evaluations has generally remained constant, we see steep increases in the number of employees considered average ("met expectations"). Similarly, we observe sharp declines in those exceeding and far exceeding expectations. Males, whites, workers with longer tenures, and those around age 50 tended to receive higher evaluations before and after the program,

but not at significantly higher rates. Certain job classifications (for example, Secretary or Trooper), particular agencies (for example, the Departments of Natural Resources or Education) and higher salary ranges also tended to impact evaluations in slightly positive manners before and after reform.

Implementation of Pay for Performance

Using performance evaluations as the primary means to link pay for performance, the following changes occurred as a result of the program (see Table 2):

From 1993 to 1995, state salaries increased by about 5.5 percent yearly. Afterwards (1996-2000), salaries rose slightly (5.7 percent). Before reform, salaries for employees receiving excellent ("exceeded" or "far exceeded expectations") evaluations increased at the same rate as other employees (5.5 percent). After 1996, however, their average salaries did increase moderately, at 7 percent. Average performers have received the same increases throughout, about 5.5 percent annually. Low performers have also received roughly the same increases, yet their raises actually decreased slightly, from a mere .75 percent to .36 percent annually.

Exodus or Employee Improvement?

Have more workers left after reform?

From 1993 until the implementation of GeorgiaGain in 1996, an average of 4,251 employees left state service annually, averaging just below five years of service. After reform to 1999, the average number of departing employees rose to 6,433 annually, possessing, roughly, the same mean years of employment. Before 1996, 4 percent of employees who "exceeded" or "far exceeded expectations" (880) left state service each year, with about seven years of service. Subsequently, the average number of these workers leaving each year has been 322, still around 4 percent, with an average tenure of just over six years.

Prior to reform, 2,509 workers who "met expectations" left annually, just below 4 percent. They worked about five years for their respective agencies. After GeorgiaGain, the average amount of these employees departing soared to 15,042 (10 percent), with length of service remaining roughly the same. As for workers who "did not meet expectations," they left at an average rate of 156 per year (before reform), representing the largest percentage (28 percent). Their mean tenure was 5.3 years. After reform, the average was 134, climbing slightly to 29 percent, with their length of service averaging almost seven years.

The Georgia Department of Human Resources (DHR) indicates that from 1996 to 1998, 16 percent of employees transferred to another classified state position, less than 1 percent transferred to an unclassified job. Five percent retired, and 1 percent expired. Of course, external factors apart from workplace dynamics may lead to employee resignations. Workers often seek enhanced economic opportunities or career changes. Personal issues also arise. A DHR exit interview questionnaire was developed in June of 2003, with a "reason for leaving" section that includes the following options: "Career change," "Go to school," "Relocation," "Lack of promotional opportunities," "Working conditions," "Work schedule," "Benefits," "Pay," "Poor supervision," "Demotion," "Transfer," "Retirement," and an open-ended choice, "Other." (11) Ensuing data may yield further insight into the effects of the program on personnel turnover.

Reassessing "Low Performers" and Tracking Separations

A major goal of reform has been to eliminate low-performing employees

Prior to GeorgiaGain, those receiving poor evaluations were dismissed, on average, at a yearly rate of 5.9 percent of the workforce, as compared to all employees, and fired at a rate of 10.6 percent. After the program began, low performers have been terminated on average at 7.9 percent, a moderate increase. For all employees, their average has decreased to 8.18 percent, still higher than their poorly performing coworkers. Also, from 1993 through 1995, low performers resigned at an annual rate of about 18.2 percent of the workforce. For all workers, the rate was 3.4 percent. From 1996 to 1998, the average rate of resignations for poor employees dropped to 14.5 percent, while the average for the entire workforce swelled to 8.2 percent.

Before 1996, inferior ("failed to meet expectations") workers were demoted at the very slight annual rate of 1 percent, basically the same as all personnel (just below 1 percent). After, the average rose by trace amounts for those receiving inadequate evaluations, along with a mere .02 percent decrease for the general workforce. Additionally, prior to GeorgiaGain, those with poor evaluations were promoted at a low yearly rate of 2.3 percent of the workforce, compared to the rest of the employees, promoted annually at 10.5 percent. Since the program began, there is even greater disparity in employee advancement. Inadequate ("failed to meet expectations") workers have been promoted by an average of only 2 percent, compared to 32 percent for all workers. Interestingly, before the advent of reform, high performers received, on average, 20.6 percent of all promotions, average workers received 79 percent, and low performers received 2 percent. Afterwards, the annual amount of promotions decreased for excellent workers (17 percent), increased for average performers (83 percent) and remained constant for poor employees (2 percent). Finally, we also see a decrease in the amount of poorly rated employees transferring to other agencies after reform.

Another goal of GeorgiaGain has been to improve the performance of inadequate personnel. Program implementation has basically not changed the number of poor performers who received high evaluation ratings the following year. From 1993 to 1995, just over 1 percent (1.02 percent) of low performers, on average annually, received a high rating on their ensuing evaluation. From 1996 to 1998, just below 1 percent (.92 percent) of poor employees received high evaluations the next year. Before reform, the average of low performers who received average ratings on their following evaluations was 51 percent. Afterwards, their average dropped substantially to 42 percent. Nevertheless, average ratings remained the mode for follow-up evaluations. Prior to 1996, 7 percent of poor performers received another low evaluation the next year compared to 8 percent after 1995. (13)

Observations

Politically, Georgia has been able to accomplish its far-reaching personnel change because of its strong right-to-work status, along with its weak unions. Also, as most agency managers were exempt from the Merit System, they had already been steadily moving their workforce toward "excepted service." The "great experiment" is attracting national attention. New York, a traditional civil service stronghold, using elements of GeorgiaGain as a model, has restructured many agencies so recruitment, staffing, position classification and testing can be streamlined. Management now has more flexibility in assigning work and transferring employees.

Some 32 other states are considering modifying their merit service. Washington has created "Management Service," separating middle management from the state's classification system, giving agencies freedom to develop their own compensation, merit and incentive plans. Texas, Maryland and Colorado have developed their own pay-for-performance systems, granting bonuses to employees who exceed targeted production rates. (14)

However, the question still beckons, is GeorgiaGain a success? While the program may be popular in the Capitol, the halls of most state bureaucratic buildings are not the place to find supporters. The workers do not like the program, and the Merit System's own surveys bear this out. Goal number one of reform was to improve the workforce, yet an overwhelming majority of employees see no improvement in bureaucratic production, motivation or responsiveness to the public since the advent of the program six years ago. While a majority of workers feel that their agency is a good place to work, similar numbers indicate low morale, decreased job security, discontent with the state's training methods, as well as dissatisfaction with salaries and the pay-for-performance system.

Another jewel of GeorgiaGain is its supposedly improved evaluation process, yet few employees are satisfied with the procedure. A majority asserts that assessments may point out some deficiencies; however, a significant majority also feels that they are inaccurate, biased and inconsistent. Overall, worker satisfaction has decreased since 1996. Ironically, despite reform, Georgia is one of the few states without laws banning nepotism. For example, the Department of Corrections, often referred to in Atlanta as the Department of "Connections," is rife with political appointees. Among the many employees who are relatives of agency directors and legislators is the daughter-in-law of former Governor Miller. One supervisor recently described a representative's relative as "dead weight," yet gave the employee a glowing evaluation and commensurate raise. In effect, the hiring process is perceived to be so unfair that many qualified applicants have avoided applying for state service. (15)

Allowing management to discipline or remove lazy and incompetent public workers with greater ease is an attractive concept among the populace. Did Act 816 fashion that situation? Since the program began, we observe fewer annual evaluations that were rated as excellent, yet no increases in the amount of inadequate ratings. The yearly rate of terminations for low-performing employees did increase, yet it remains below pace for the entire workforce. Additionally, demotions for poor workers generally remained constant. Resignations for poor employees actually decreased after GeorgiaGain, while (consistent with survey findings) resignations for all workers increased significantly. Overall, the largest increase in the percentage of departing employees was among the average performers. The state has lost only slightly more poor performers since reform. Also, since reform, highly rated employees have been promoted at a lower rate than average employees, yet the highest salary increases, although modest, have gone to workers with excellent evaluations. Also, fewer inadequately rated staff members have received improved follow-up evaluations each year since 1996.

Neighboring South Carolina's attempt at reform has yielded difficulties, as well. Although there was no dismantling of its civil service, the State Government Accountability Act gave agency managers more discretion in hiring (choosing workers from outside the traditional central pool), reclassification, transfers and promotions. Adjustments on salaries could now be performance-based, probationary periods extended, and managers could also establish job-sharing and flextime programs. (16) While agency directors were quick to support the program, less than half of the state's agencies have actually adopted the reforms. Inertia, politics, resistance from middle management and lack of resources seem to stand in the way of change. Of course, other social, political and economic factors affect agency performance and morale. Paul Light (17) found steadily declining satisfaction, motivation and productivity in the federal service, particularly following the September 11th attacks.

Georgia has become the first state to eliminate classified service, and other states will continue to restructure their merit service in some manner. A good place to determine the success of each type of reform will be through further analyses of productivity changes brought about by pay-for-performance programs. However, achievements in efficiency, along with changes in employee morale, will continue to be difficult to determine in large, diverse, public-service-oriented bureaucracies.

Appendix A
Employee Responses to Additional Merit Service Survey

                                                             Percentage
                                                                 In
                                                             Agreement

My agency is a good place to work.                              70

There is a lot of turnover (retirements, resignations,          69
terminations) in my work unit

Employees are appreciated as assets by management               35

I am satisfied with my pay                                      19

Morale is high in my work unit                                  30

Management has imposed limits on the number of                  85
"outstanding" performance ratings

Office politics has more to do with ratings than                76
performance on the job

My last performance appraisal accurately reflected my work      50

It is possible to identify employee development needs           49
through the appraisal process

There is too much paperwork in regard to performance            75
evaluations

It is very important to document my own performance             80

GeorgiaGain's pay-for-performance system is a good way to       19
motivate employees

GeorgiaGain has not been completely implemented               68.2

Management's commitment to implementing GeorgiaGain has         68
declined steadily

Pay for performance was promised and delivered under            25
GeorgiaGain

GeorgiaGain is a way of getting more work out of state          73
employees without having to provide any real benefits

My pay is based on how well I do my job                         20

There is too much stress on money as an incentive and not       55
enough on other sources of motivation

Favoritism is a problem for the pay-for-performance             68
program

State money has not been made available to reward good          91
performers with pay increases

There is conflict over annual pay raises in my work group       55

The pay I receive is not competitive with the private           57
sector

Training on how to carry out provisions of GeorgiaGain is       35
adequate

It is hard to recruit qualified job applicants                  85

High-performing employees in my work unit consistently          68
receive pay increases greater than those given to average
performing workers

Although I deserved one, I could not get a pay raise            31
because I reached the top of my pay range

Performance appraisals are helpful in identifying employee      64
weaknesses

I did not get a job promotion or reward I was qualified        9.7
for because of my political beliefs or the political
connections of others

Under the authority of the Civil Service Reform Law, my         38
agency can hire highly qualified people in a timely manner

Under the Civil Service Reform Law, my agency has               36
established a highly effective Human Resources program

The Civil Service Reform Law has made the state workforce       25
more productive and responsive to the public

The Civil Service Reform Law has made it easier to fire         75
employees

It has been possible to terminate low-performing employees      49
without major procedural delays

Supervising workers in unclassified positions is easier       24.5
than supervising classified workers

Unclassified workers tend to work harder than classified      21.7
employees

Because of civil service reform, I believe that now there       70
is no job security in state employment

Leaving a classified position for an unclassified one is a      80
very risky step

The provisions and purposes of civil service reform have        37
been clearly communicated to me

There has been little if any change in the Human Resources      70 (18)
practices of my agency since the Civil Service Reform Law
was enacted

Notes

(1) S. T. Elmore and G. L. Cornish. (2000), compiled a data analysis report for the Georgia Merit System, Measuring goal attainment for GeorgiaGain and Merit System Reform, Athens, GA: Vinson Institute of Government, University of GA.

(2) The GeorgiaGain Task Force's (1998), Building excellence: A new pay and performance plan for the State of Georgia, Atlanta: GA Department of Labor, provides highlights of the state's personnel reform program.

(3) See S. T. Elmore, et al. (2000). Section on "historical background."

(4) J. M. Shafritz, Rosenbloom, D. H., Riccucci, N. M., Naff, K. C., & Hyde, A. C. (2001). Personnel Management in Government, Politics and Process (5th cd.). New York: Dekker. See "The death of the merit system in Georgia."

(5) p. Hart. (2002). "A crisis in public service, research of Georgia public employees." GSEU Local 1985 Talking Union, 7, 2. The February newsletter covers union surveys of employees' attitudes toward GeorgiaGain.

(6) J.E. Kellough, Nigro, L. G., & Cornish, G.'s (2000). Report on the Findings of a Survey of Georgia State Employees About GeorgiaGain and Act 816 for the Georgia Merit System, Atlanta: Applied Research Center, Georgia State University; GA Merit System; Athens, GA: Vinson Institute of Government, University of GA, contains surveys of workers' feelings toward reform and an analysis of the program. The report was submitted to Majorie H. Young, Commissioner of the Georgia Merit System, on September 12, 2000.

(7) The survey is a 5 percent stratified random sample accurate within .90 percentage points at a 95 percent confidence level taken across all agencies, positions, length of tenure, gender, age, educational level, race and classified versus unclassified status.

(8) From S. T. Elmore and G. L. Cornish. (2000). Section on "Assure fair performance ratings."

(9) From S. T. Elmore and G. L. Cornish. (2000). Section on "Provide equitable compensation based on merit and performance."

(10) From S. T. Elmore and G. L. Cornish. (2000). Section on "Take action to address inadequate performance."

(11) Georgia Department of Human Resources. (1998). Staff Turnover Study, Atlanta: Evaluation and Reporting Section. Report and policy #1906, Attachment #1.

(12) From S. T. Elmore and G. L. Cornish. (2000). Section on "Take action to address inadequate performance."

(13) From S. T. Elmore and G. L. Cornish. (2000). Section on "Advance employees on the basis of abilities, knowledge and skills."

(14) C. K. Rylander. Texas performance review, changing the status quo, toward smaller, smarter government, Austin: TX Comptroller of Public Accounts Office, 2002.

(15) Louisiana State University Professor Richard White discusses nepotism and difficulties in hiring qualified personnel in Georgia, in J. O. Hansen, Salzer, J., & Tharpe, J. (20002). "Connections a Big Boost in Landing State Jobs," The Atlanta Journal Constitution, June 9, Al, AS-A9.

(16) J. M. Shafritz, et al. (2001), pages 80-81.

(17) Light, P. (2002). The Troubled State of the Federal Public Service, Washington: The Brookings Institution's Center for Public Service. June report.

(18) From J. E. Kellough, et al. (2000). Section on "Survey findings."

Author

Robert M. Sanders Department of Political Science State University of West Georgia Carrollton, GA 30118 Phone: (770) 836-4572 Department Phone: (770) 836-6504 Fax: (770) 836-4665 E-mail- bsanders@westga.edu

Dr. Robert M. Sanders is an associate professor of public administration at the State University of West Georgia with consulting activity and published research in the areas of state bureaucracy, policy and social service delivery. He has also served as president of the Georgia Chapter of the American Society for Public Administration.

Table 1. Employee Satisfaction Responses

Item                                        %          %         %
                                         agreeing   agreeing   change
                                          in '93     in '00

1) I like my job.                          94%         90%       -4.0

2) Because of dissatisfaction with my      17%       25.5%       +8.5
   job or with state government, I am
   likely to leave GA service within
   the next 12 months for another job.

3) On my job, I know what is expected      95%       86.8%       -8.2
   of me.

4) Performance appraisal discussions       77%         64%        -13
   are useful in helping to improve my
   performance.

5) I understand how my supervisor          73%       62.6%      -10.4
   evaluates my performance.

6) My job description provides the         78%       62.2%      -15.8
   information needed to establish
   clear standards and expectations
   used to evaluate my performance.

7) Performance appraisals in my work       64%       50.3%      -13.7
   unit are conducted fairly.

8) The state offers me enough training     60%         47%        -13
   to grow and develop.

9) My work unit has high performance       88%       77.1%      -10.9
   expectations for employees.

Table 2. Salary Increase Rates by Performance Groups

Group                   '93-'94     '94-'95     '95-'96     '96-'97

All employees            4.27%       5.95%       6.29%       5.74%
High performers (h)      4.06%       6.09%       6.26%       6.28%
Average workers (a)      4.39%       5.95%       6.34%       5.73%
Low Performers (l)       0.46%       1.47%       0.34%      -0.11%

Group                   '97-'98     '98-'99     '99-'00

All employees            5.81%       5.98%       4.78%
High performers (h)      7.80%       8.08%       6.72%
Average workers (a)      5.58%       5.63%       4.42%
Low Performers (l)       0.08%       0.60%       0.55%

(h) Exceeded or far exceeded expectations; (a) Met expectations;
(l) Failed to meet expectations.

Table 3. Separations by Performance Groups

Group                   1993       1994       1995       1996

High performers *        154        668        682        513
Percentage              1.32       4.13       4.22       6.22
Mean Tenure **            80         82         85         85

Average workers *        614      3,150      3,812      4,923
Percentage              1.88       6.14       6.77       5.67
Mean Tenure               64         59         52         59

Low Performers *          46        245        239        185
Percentage             10.11      31.94      35.15      32.98
Mean Tenure               62         61         64         74

No evaluation          1,096      1,050      1,205      2,467
Total Employees        1,910      5,113      5,938      8,088
Mean tenure               47         57         56         61

Group                   1997       1998       1999      Total

High performers *        298        419        316      3,050
Percentage              3.74       4.16       2.92
Mean Tenure **            76         71         73         80

Average workers *      6,239      5,381      3,844     27,963
Percentage             10.60       9.37       6.81
Mean Tenure               61         58         57         58

Low Performers *         166        192         88      1,161
Percentage             30.57      38.17      15.66
Mean Tenure               81         92         77         73

No evaluation          1,268      1,801      1,498     10,385
Total Employees        7,971      7,973      5,746     42,559
Mean tenure               61         58         56         58

* Number of employees.

** Tenure at job measured in months. (10)

Table 4. Low Performers' (LP) Activity and Types of Separations

Activity & Type       1993     1994     1995     1996     1997     1998

Dismissals (LP)      5.05%    5.87%    6.62%    7.01%    9.09%    7.47%
For all workers      2.07%    5.20%    6.19%    7.71%    8.33%    8.50%

Resignations (LP)   14.51%   19.17%   21.18%   14.63%   13.95%   14.95%
For all workers      2.07%    5.20%    6.19%    7.71%    8.33%    8.50%

Demotions (LP)       1.32%    1.30%    0.29%    1.37%    0.63%    1.07%
For all workers      0.04%    0.09%    0.08%    0.06%    0.05%    0.05%

Promotions (LP)      2.64%    2.22%    2.06%    1.22%    2.66%    2.31%
For all workers     11.81%   12.72%   11.91%   10.37%    8.47%   12.83%

Next Evaluation for Low Performers:

Received High        1.32%    1.30%    0.44%    0.61%    1.25%    0.89%
Received Average    54.73%   51.78%   47.94%   44.36%   34.40%   46.23%
Received Low         9.45%    6.26%    5.29%   11.28%    6.11%    6.95%

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