Banking Industry Must Unite to Fight Clinton's Plan for a Single Regulator

By Furash, Edward E. | American Banker, December 21, 1993 | Go to article overview

Banking Industry Must Unite to Fight Clinton's Plan for a Single Regulator


Furash, Edward E., American Banker


The Clinton administration disguised income redistribution and higher taxes as deficit reduction.

Similarly, its proposal for a single bank regulator disguises political domination of bank lending as a way to simplify government and lower the cost of regulation.

The scheme also fails to address the urgent need to comprehensively reform regulation of the financial services industry.

The proposal has superficial attractions, including "reinventing government" and neatening the regulatory structure.

But looking deeply, one discovers that the real objective is political control of the economy and implementation of a social agenda - without the bother of getting legislation through Congress.

An Attack on the Fed

An independent, powerful Fed, with its responsibility to control inflation, is the principal obstacle to the fulfillment of that ambition. So the proposal contains what is arguably one of the cleverest and most dangerous attacks ever mounted on the independence of the Federal Reserve System.

How would the administration's goal be accomplished by the Federal Banking Commission?

First, by its composition. Members would be politically appointed, with relatively short terms - five years. The idea that they would be independent of the administration is transparent nonsense.

White House Control

In fact, the President would control three of the five commission votes - those of the chairman, the Treasury secretary, and the outside member from the President's party. They would be completely dependent on the administration.

Furthermore, the outside member from the opposition party would owe his position to the President.

The fifth member - the chairman of the Fed - would be effectively isolated.

Would the commission chairman and other presidential appointees be tough, experienced regulators, concerned with safety and soundness and the health of the industry? Or would they be more influenced by the politicians who approve their appointments, and by special interests - housing groups, diversity advocates, and others?

Worrisome Precedent

The recent appointment to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. board of an individual whose sole banking expertise is in government relations, community relations, and philanthropy answers the question - and the answer is extremely worrisome.

The political composition of the commission would make it susceptible to influence by members of Congress from the President's party - Republican or Democrat. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited article

Banking Industry Must Unite to Fight Clinton's Plan for a Single Regulator
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Author Advanced search

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.