Why We Must Talk to the Generals: Focusing on Aung San Suu Kyi May Not Be the Best Way to Bring Democracy to Burma, Argues Maung Zarni. Real Change, He Says, Will Require the Co-Operation of Those Now in Power

By Zarni, Maung | New Statesman (1996), August 14, 2006 | Go to article overview

Why We Must Talk to the Generals: Focusing on Aung San Suu Kyi May Not Be the Best Way to Bring Democracy to Burma, Argues Maung Zarni. Real Change, He Says, Will Require the Co-Operation of Those Now in Power


Zarni, Maung, New Statesman (1996)


Starting as one of the progressive political actors that drove out the fascist Japanese occupiers, the tatmadaw (combined armed forces) now stands accused of similar abuse. But we need to discard demonisation. It cannot be part of our solution. It has ill served our nation. Like it or not, the army has succeeded in inscribing its future role on our body politic. It is so deeply entrenched in our politics, economy and bureaucracy that engagement with the military regime is necessary if there is to be any chance for Burma's misery and isolation to end.

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The tatmadaw is the same force that was founded by Bogyoke Aung San, the slain independence hero, army general and father of Aung San Suu Kyi. The generals are mainly drawn from the urban elite, but hundreds of thousands of Burmese families, of all ethnicities, have members of the army in their midst. However unpalatable the thought, both the leaders and the rank and file are unmistakably cut from the same existential fabric as the rest of us. They all embrace a xenophobic nationalism. They are family men who worship the same Buddha and believe in miracles and astrology. They all suffer from the anxieties and sense of insecurity that come with being at the centre of the vicious cycle of post-independence conflicts, both with their own citizens and now with the outside world.

For years, the west had no interest in Burma. During the cold war, there was no outcry when Karen insurgents blew up Rangoon-Mandalay passenger trains or when the tatmadaw burned down suspected guerrilla villages. Living behind the teak curtain of isolation imposed by the army, we heard about General Ne Win--who ended our parliamentary democracy in 1962 and gave us 26 years of one-party socialist rule--having tea with Her Majesty the Queen at Buckingham Palace while the CIA trained his deputies in counter-intelligence. Times have changed.

The post-cold war west has rediscovered human rights and no longer welcomes Ne Win's successors, nor tolerates their style of authoritarian governance. Yet the almost exclusive focus on Aung San Suu Kyi and her epic story has been unhelpful. Though well-intentioned, her endorsement of the tourist boycott, economic sanctions and political isolation has failed, and holds back the possibility of reform.

The army approaches politics as if it were a war, seeking unity at gunpoint. It suffers from a sense of being under siege by the west. It is the public that bears the enormous cost of the country's conflict. The record of the military governments since 1962 in public health, education, economy, human resource development, natural resource management, rural development and ethnic integration is abysmal. No improvement can be expected as long as the generals' priorities remain security, security and security.

But the military is capable of change from within, for better or worse. After all, despite decades of careful screening and intense propaganda aimed at ensuring ideological coherence, it still suffers chronic internal power struggles.

Change within the army, however, is slow and costly to those who initiate it. In 1976 Captain Ohn Kyaw Myint, an aide-de-camp to the then vice chief of staff, led an abortive coup to install a reformist government. The young ringleader was hanged and his co-conspirators, including the chief of staff, were all sacked. In 1983 Brigadier Tin Oo, then national security adviser, was ousted by the senior military leaders and his entire national intelligence network dissolved. The senior army leadership felt the spymaster was becoming too powerful. In 2004 General Khin Nyunt, who held executive posts as prime minister and chief of military intelligence, reached out to the Burmese opposition as well as the west. This overture by the third most powerful general was thwarted by inward-looking hardliners, who ousted him and dismantled his power base. …

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Why We Must Talk to the Generals: Focusing on Aung San Suu Kyi May Not Be the Best Way to Bring Democracy to Burma, Argues Maung Zarni. Real Change, He Says, Will Require the Co-Operation of Those Now in Power
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