It Was a Failure of Regulation: The Evidence from History Is Clear. Weakly Controlled Banking Systems Tend to Have a High Proportion of Bad Loans and Thus to Collapse
Crafts, Nicholas, New Statesman (1996)
The bank failures of recent weeks have been shocking. For many people it is almost beyond belief that names such as Bradford & Bingley, HBOS, Lehmann Brothers and Wachovia could disappear apparently just like that. Yet economic history tells us that the risk of banking crises is ever present, goes up in an age of globalisation as capital becomes more internationally mobile and requires effective regulation to be contained.
The most infamous banking crises in economic history were those of the 1930s and the worst affected country was the United States, in which 9,000 banks failed between 1929 and 1933, a period when the money supply and real GDP fell by 29 and 33 per cent, respectively. As is well-known, the Roosevelt administration responded to the crisis with a "Bank Holiday", the introduction of Federal Deposit Insurance, re-regulation of the banking system and closure of a further 1,000 banks, and then recapitalised the banking system through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. By 1935, the government in effect owned about a third of the American banking system and the fiscal cost of state aid to the financial system was 13 per cent of GDP. This was not, of course, the end of capitalism but a necessary, temporary phase on the road to recovery in the later 1930s.
The banking crisis of the American Great Depression was an extreme event but the risks and the costs of a milder version are not trivial. It has been found that in recent decades there has been around a 2 per cent chance per year that a country will have a banking crisis and that the cumulative GDP loss when this happens is about 6 per cent of GDP. Moreover, World Bank research shows that the fiscal costs of a banking crisis are frequently 10 per cent or more of GDP.
Mainstream economists are well aware that important "market failure" issues arise in the context of banking. In a world of imperfect and asymmetric information, the banking system is prone to failures of monitoring by depositors (who face a free-rider problem) and excessive risk-taking ("moral hazard") by bankers. Bank runs are an ever-present risk in a context of uncertainty about the true value of bank assets and the inability of depositors to co-ordinate their actions. The implications are that solvent banks with liquidity problems may be forced into bankruptcy and that a scramble for liquidity may entail meltdown risks for the financial system. These points were long ago well articulated by writers such as Frederic Mishkin, and have found their way into the textbooks.
Several equally well-known and important policy lessons follow. …