After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War

By House, Jonathan M. | Military Review, July-August 2014 | Go to article overview

After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War


House, Jonathan M., Military Review


AFTER LEANING TO ONE SIDE: China and Its Allies in the Cold War

Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li, Woodrow Wilson Center and Stanford University Press, Washington DC, 2011, 331 pages, $60.00

As the Cold War recedes into history, researchers have growing access to the archives of various participants. After several decades of research and at least one period of imprisonment, historian Zhihua Shen has obtained extensive records from both China and the former Soviet Union. This has allowed him and his wife, Danhui Li, to assemble an explanation of the tangled relationships between the two leading Marxist regimes, as well as Beijing's troubled partnerships with North Korea and North Vietnam. The resulting picture, while still incomplete, helps Westerners better understand their former adversaries.

A case in point is the 1950 Chinese intervention in the Korean conflict, an intervention that inflicted a serious, if temporary defeat upon the United States and its allies. The traditional explanation for this intervention was that Beijing was responding to a perceived threat as U.N. forces approached its borders after defeating North Korea. More recently, revisionists such as Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai have argued that Mao Zedong was so angered by American intervention in Asia that he concentrated troops on the Yalu River even before the U.N. counteroffensive at Inchon. Mao's principal reasons for delaying his attack thereafter were to obtain more Soviet military aid and satisfy his critics within the Chinese government. Professor Shen combines these two stories, suggesting that while Mao was inspired partly by a sense of international solidarity with the Korean communists, he sought to avoid direct conflict as long as possible. Mao's actual reasons for intervention were a complex mixture of a perceived threat from the United States, a desire to limit Soviet influence in the region, and a need to convince Joseph Stalin of China's loyalty. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited article

After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this article
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.