Philosophy: Vol. 90, No. 1, January 2015

The Review of Metaphysics, March 2015 | Go to article overview

Philosophy: Vol. 90, No. 1, January 2015


Why Isn't There More Progress in Philosophy? DAVID J. CHALMERS

Is there progress in philosophy? A glass-half-full view is that there is some progress in philosophy. A glass-half-empty view is that there is not as much as we would like. The paper articulates a version of the glass-halfempty view, argues for it, and then addresses the crucial question of what explains it.

The Identity of Indiscemibles, MICHAEL WREEN

A number of distinctions are needed to assess the Identity of Indiscemibles. The first concerns its purported status as true or, more strongly, necessarily true. The second concerns the nature of the properties the principle ranges over. One way to divide up properties is in terms of those that entail the existence of a particular object, those that entail the existence of an object but no particular object, and those that don't entail the existence of an object at all. A second way to divide up properties is in terms of "indicative" and "counterfactual" properties. Combining these three distinctions yields twelve different versions of the Identity of Indiscemibles. In the long ran, however, four more are needed to do the principle justice. Therefore, sixteen different versions of the principle need to be assessed, and this paper does that. Particular attention is paid to methodology and to constraints on the generation of properties needed to support various versions of the principle. Bottom-up reasoning is found sufficient to vindicate the great majority of them, but there does not appear to be a good bottom-up or top-down argument for the two most interesting and important versions of the Identity of Indiscemibles, and there is some reason to think both false. An open mind needs to be kept, however, since definitively establishing or refuting them probably requires a relatively complete and plausible metaphysics.

How We Decide in Moral Situations, DAVID KASPAR

The role normative ethics has in guiding action is unclear. Moral theorists once hoped that they could devise a decision procedure that would enable agents to solve difficult moral problems. Repeated attacks by antitheorists seemingly dashed this hope. Although the dispute between moral theorists and antitheorists rages no longer, no decisive victor has emerged. This paper argues that in order to determine how we ought to make moral decisions, we must first examine how we decide in moral situations. Intuitionism correctly captures the essence of the moral element in such situations, finding itself located somewhere between moral theory and antitheory. In order that intuitionism may constitute an improvement over predecessors in normative ethics, we must proceed with awareness of the limits imposed by the still dominant framework of modern moral theory. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited article

Philosophy: Vol. 90, No. 1, January 2015
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this article
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.