A Realistic U.S. Policy - the Interests of China, Japan, Russia and the United States Will Continue to Intersect on the Korean Peninsula, the Strategic Crossroads of Northeast Asia

By Chamberlin, Paul F. | The World and I, January 2003 | Go to article overview

A Realistic U.S. Policy - the Interests of China, Japan, Russia and the United States Will Continue to Intersect on the Korean Peninsula, the Strategic Crossroads of Northeast Asia


Chamberlin, Paul F., The World and I


One Korea is better than two, Koreans believe, assuming a satisfactory quality of life in unified Korea. Koreans' joy at being liberated after 35 years of brutal colonization by Imperial Japan in 1945 quickly yielded to bitter disappointment as the Cold War created two Koreas, shattering one of the world's oldest unified societies. The Korean War represented North Korea's forceful effort to reunify and communize Korea in the early 1950s.

South Koreans today are embarked on a peaceful campaign to conclude the Cold War on the Korean peninsula and reunify their divided nation. The United States has an important role to play in this process, with significant implications for national strategy. North Korea's revelation in October 2002 that it was conducting a clandestine nuclear program presents challenges and opportunities for U.S. foreign policy, especially as North Korea is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Effective foreign policy achieves U.S. national objectives through measures tailored to different environments. U.S.-Korea policy produced regional peace and prosperity after the Korean War by deterring further aggression by the northern Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and promoting democratization and economic development in the southern Republic of Korea (ROK). U.S. declaratory policy, including the U.S.- ROK mutual defense treaty, and ROK willingness to host U.S. military forces in Korea have deterred North Korea from again invading the ROK.

However, Pyongyang's decisions in the 1980s to develop such weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles raised questions about the ability of deterrence policy alone to maintain regional peace and stability and prevent the proliferation of WMD. Pyongyang's recent nuclear revelation heightens awareness that deterring foreign aggression is one thing, but stopping a sovereign government from conducting indigenous programs is quite another.

Currently, North Korea fields one of the world's largest militaries. It seeks better WMD capabilities that challenge U.S. global security interests and reinforce U.S. concerns regarding Pyongyang's intentions toward two U.S. treaty allies: the ROK and Japan. The United States assesses North Korea to have chemical weapons, a biological weapons development program, and possibly a small (1--2) nuclear weapons arsenal.

Moreover, Pyongyang deploys thousands of rockets. Its short- and medium-range (Nodong) ballistic missiles could deliver nuclear and other WMD against targets throughout South Korea and much of Japan, including U.S. military forces and economic interests. Intercontinental Taepodong II ballistic missiles currently under development could attack the United States, should they ever be deployed. By contrast, neither the ROK nor Japan has nuclear weapons. Both countries rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, although Seoul briefly considered developing nuclear weapons in the early 1970s after the Nixon administration reduced U.S. forces without fully consulting Seoul.

This overview prompts a number of questions. What are North Korea's objectives in sustaining such a large military and developing WMD? How can the United States induce North Korea to stop developing such aggressive capabilities, especially given its history of violating international agreements? What are the views of the ROK and Japan, U.S. allies directly threatened by North Korea? What is the desirable political, economic, and security future of Northeast Asia and especially the Korean peninsula? As effective near-term policy is best crafted with a vision of the desired end state, let's begin at the end.

End state: unified Korea

The interests of China, Japan, Russia, and the United States will likely continue to intersect on the Korean peninsula, the strategic crossroads of Northeast Asia. Russia began seeking a role there in the late nineteenth century. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited article

A Realistic U.S. Policy - the Interests of China, Japan, Russia and the United States Will Continue to Intersect on the Korean Peninsula, the Strategic Crossroads of Northeast Asia
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this article
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.