The Future of NATO: Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 1, 2003

By Asmus, Ronald D. | Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly, March 3, 2003 | Go to article overview

The Future of NATO: Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 1, 2003


Asmus, Ronald D., Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly


It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the future of NATO and the accession of seven new Central and East European members to the North Atlantic Treaty. This is a historical moment. The vision of a Europe whole and free stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea set out a decade ago is now within our reach.

I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the leaders and peoples of each of the seven countries invited to join the Alliance at the Prague summit last November. This is a very special moment for them and a vindication of their hard work and perseverance over many years. While they have been part of the West in spirit for a long time, they will now join the West's premier military alliance to help us defend the territory and interests of the Euro-Atlantic community. As a result, Europe will be more peaceful, democratic and secure.

It is also a special moment for those Americans who have worked with these countries to help make this day become reality. I would like to congratulate the Administration as well as this Committee for its leadership and support of NATO enlargement. Many members of this Committee know how much work and heavy lifting was also required here in the United States to make this day possible. Were it not for the leadership, perseverance and skill demonstrated by Washington, including by the leadership of this Committee, I doubt we would be here today.

We are also meeting at a time when the Alliance is in trouble. While we celebrate the extension of the boundaries of freedom and security eastward, we know that the trans-Atlantic relationship faces one of the deepest crises in its history. The United States is fighting a war in Iraq and many of our key NATO allies are not with us. An Alliance that has committed itself to dealing with the problems of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as a core mission, finds itself unable to find common ground on how to confront that challenge in the real world in the form of Saddam Hussein. As a result, NATO is divided and marginalized at a time when Western unity, solidarity and support are very much needed.

One only has to read the newspapers to see the growing doubts on both sides of the Atlantic about NATO's future viability. Indeed, in recent weeks I have often been asked why we are even bothering to enlarge the Alliance further when many people consider it to be in a process of decline. My answer has been that it is still in America's interest to successfully complete this round of enlargement in spite of current trans-Atlantic differences. Let me explain why.

First, we must not lose sight of what we set out to accomplish by opening NATO's door to Central and Eastern Europe. From the beginning, the purpose of NATO enlargement was to help lock in a new peace order in Europe following communism's collapse and the end of the Cold War. We wanted to promote a process of pan-European integration and reconciliation that would make the prospect of armed conflict as inconceivable in the eastern half of the continent as it had become in the western half.

To a remarkable degree, we have succeeded in doing so. For much of the 20th century, Europe was the greatest potential source of conflict anywhere in the world. It was there where the great wars of the 20th century had started, and where we feared the Cold War could become a hot one. Today, the continent is more peaceful, democratic and secure than at any time in recent history. And strategic cooperation across the Atlantic between the U.S. and Europe through NATO is a big part of the reason why.

When I was in the State Department, I often told my staff that our goal was to integrate all the countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea within a decade of communism's collapse. If the West failed to achieve this, I told them at the time, future historians were likely to condemn us as having failed to seize this moment of history - and rightly so. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited article

The Future of NATO: Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 1, 2003
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.