Effects of Health Insurance and Medical Care Inflation on Voluntary Enlistment in the Army: An Empirical Study in the United States

By Cebula, Richard J. | International Journal of Management, March 2011 | Go to article overview

Effects of Health Insurance and Medical Care Inflation on Voluntary Enlistment in the Army: An Empirical Study in the United States


Cebula, Richard J., International Journal of Management


Voluntary enlistment in the military is motivated by a variety of factors, including economic forces such as employment opportunities, income prospects, and employer-provided benefits such as health insurance. This study investigates two research questions that to date have been neglected, namely: (1) does a higher percentage of the civilian population without health insurance act as an incentive for more civilians to voluntarily enlist in the U.S. Army?; and (2) does a higher level of medical care inflation act as an incentive for more civilians to voluntarily enlist in the U.S. Army? Within a cost-benefit framework, the empirical analysis uses annual data for the years 1974 through 2008, the only years to date for which all of the variables in the model are dependable after the end of military conscription in the U.S. in 1973. The empirical estimates support the propositions that the greater the percentage of the civilian population without health insurance, the greater the rate of voluntary enlistment in the U.S. Army and that the greater the medical care inflation rate, the greater the rate of voluntary enlistment in the U.S. Army.

(ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.)

I. Introduction

Myriad dimensions of the health care and health insurance industries have attracted the attention of researchers. The issues investigated by these researchers range from those of pharmaceutical expenditures, hospital profitability, and hospital efficiency to those of moral hazard and health insurance, the effectiveness of preventive health care measures, mental health expenditures, medical malpractice, nurse training and staffing, physician staffing, and causes of health care inflation (Chirikos, 1998-99; Daniels and Gatsonis, 1999; Given, 1996; Glied, 2003; Goodman and Stano, 2000; Hart et al, 1997; Jordan, 2001; Karsten, 1995; Koch and Cebula, 1992; Laundsen, et al, 2010; Moscone and Knapp, 2005; Okunade, 2001, 2003; Olsen, 1996). One of the most important and contentious issues in this research, the one receiving the greatest increase in attention in recent years is health insurance coverage or the lack thereof (Bharmal and Thomas, 2005; Bundorf andPauly, 2002; Cebula, 2006; Dushi andHomg, 2003; Fnck andBopp, 2005; Gruber, 2003; Harris and Keane, 1999; Holahan et al, 2003; Kronick and Gilmer, 2002; Marstellar et al, 1998; Newhouse, 1994; Nyman, 2003; Swartz, 2001; 2003).

This intensive and extensive research can be attributed to several issues. Presumably, as argued in Dushi and Honig (2003, p. 252), at least part of this increased research attention can be attributed to the fact that there has been a noticeable decline in health insurance coverage in the U.S., especially over the last two decades. Indeed, over 1 5 years ago, Cutler (1994, p. 20) had observed that "About 15 percent of the population... are uninsured." More recently, for the year 2003, Bharmal and Thomas (2005, p. 643)

observe that the number of uninsured reached 43.6 million or 17.3 percent of persons under the age of 65. Amidst the national debate in recent years over health care reform in the U.S., claims of the extent of the uninsured have run as high as 47 million (Cebula, Nair-Reichert, and Taylor, 2010).

The present study endeavors to provide insights into two very different dimensions of the overall health insurance/healthcare issue. In particular, this study first hypothesizes that the greater the percentage of the civilian population that is without health insurance, the greater the incentive at the margin for civilians to enlist in the U.S. Army, ceteris paribus, paralleling in principle the rather different specifications found in Cebula, Nair-Reichert, and Taylor (2010). Next, this study hypothesizes that the greater the medical care inflation rate, the greater the incentive at the margin for civilians to enlist in the U.S. Army, ceteris paribus, thusly addressing a key issue overlooked in Cebula, Nair-Reichert, and Taylor (2010). …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited article

Effects of Health Insurance and Medical Care Inflation on Voluntary Enlistment in the Army: An Empirical Study in the United States
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this article
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.