NONPROLIFERATION NORMS: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint

By Stitt, Orrin | Military Review, July/August 2011 | Go to article overview

NONPROLIFERATION NORMS: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint


Stitt, Orrin, Military Review


NONPROLIFERATION NORMS: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint, Maria Rost Rublee, University of Georgia Press, Athens, GA, 2009, 297 pages, $22.95.

Nonproliferation Norms is a theoretical and analytical study in nuclear decision making, using social psychology as a means of evaluating states' choices in the interactive and dynamic global environment. Maria Rost Rublee, a lecturer at the University of Auckland, is a former intelligence officer in the Defense Intelligence Agency. Her analyses of the democratic societies in Japan, Sweden, and Germany are complete and informative, giving the reader a comprehensive background and understanding of the decisionmaking dynamics involved in these countries.

By means of comparison between three theories of international relations dynamics, the author analyzes the tangible evidence surrounding the evolutions of five states' nuclear weapons programs. First, she explores the lens of "realism" and the implications of state independence and self-determination to create security, potentially through acquisition of nuclear weapons to offset national threats. The second theory, "neoliberal institutionalism," considers nonproliferation as a cooperative move to achieve lower transaction costs and increase transparency, where states benefit by technology transfer and international assistance with peaceful scientific nuclear programs, which outweigh the costs of sole (rogue) development. Finally, Rublee examines each of the five states' nuclear programs through "constructivism," her central premise, by which she investigates internal and international social environments, with roles and norms established by the nonproliferation community, which enforces states to conform to disarmament ideals.

However, her presupposition of constructivism as an encompassing model overlooks a fundamental realism aspect: internal threats to state security, particularly in dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. Specifically, Egypt and Libya, two state governments that were the progeny of military coups in 1954 and 1969, respectively, are still susceptible to violent internal conflict. Both states previously pursued nuclear armament programs, only to later abandon their efforts and investments. Rublee attributes the cause as their desire to conform to international nonproliferation norms, whereas the truth is probably closer to a theory proposed by game-theorist and Nobel Laureate economist Thomas C. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited article

NONPROLIFERATION NORMS: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this article
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.