Arms Control Adrift? Prospects for 1999

By Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr.; Rhinelander, John et al. | Arms Control Today, March 1999 | Go to article overview

Arms Control Adrift? Prospects for 1999

Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr., Rhinelander, John, Bunn, Matthew, Albright, David, Kimball, Daryl, Arms Control Today

Before its annual membership meeting and luncheon on March 26, the Arms Control Association (ACA) presented a panel discussion on the arms control issues facing the Clinton administration in 1999, including national missile defense and the ABM Treaty, "loose nukes" in Russia, the inspections stalemate with Iraq, and efforts to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Panelists included Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., ACA president and executive director; John B. Rhinelander, ACA vice-chairman

and former legal advisor to the U.S. SALT I delegation that negotiated the ABM Treaty; Matthew Bunn, assistant director of the Science, Technology and Public Policy Program at Harvard University; David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security; and Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers. Below is an edited version of the panelists' remarks and the question and answer session that followed.

Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.:

It is generally a good idea not to discuss controversial on-going events while they are in mid-course; however, I think that before turning to a discussion of the events of the last year something must be said about Kosovo, which comes at a most difficult time. The past year has been a bad one for arms control. There is little progress and some retrogression to report. We meet today in the shadow of NATO bombings over Kosovo. Whatever one's view of the wisdom and legitimacy of this action, I think one thing is clear: the casualties of these events will include arms control progress, and U.S.Russian relations, at least in the short term.

Administration experts assure us that they are confident that the Russian economy is in such a disastrous state that Russia will quickly overcome any misgivings or bitterness about the current event in order to obtain U.S. and international financial support. I believe, however, that the planning of the strike to coincide with Primakov's long-scheduled U.S. visit to discuss arms control matters is an unprecedented, insensitive and contemptuous action on the part of the United States and NATO. I think the image of Primakov turning his plane around over the Atlantic, having talked with the Vice President and failing to obtain assurances that the strikes would not begin during his visit, and the image of Yeltsin pleading with Clinton for half an hour just before the strikes began, not to undertake them, will live a long time in the Russian mind and influence the course of events in a negative fashion. Unless the administration takes some really heroic steps to reassure Russia, and Russia shows a forbearance that is most uncommon among national states whose advice has been ignored, the prospects for Duma ratification of START II-and further progress in strategic reductions-during the final two years of the Clinton administration are very poor indeed.

Now, let me turn briefly to the area of strategic arms. The tragedy of the past year has been a series of U.S. actions that seem almost calculated to dissuade the Duma from ratifying START II. Under Primakov, the Russian government accelerated its efforts to build Duma support for START II and made really a major effort that appeared to be successful. By the end of 1998, the Duma appeared to be prepared to move ahead on ratification, despite their concerns about NATO and frustration with their own military problems. In fact, on December 25th, the Duma was scheduled to vote approval of the treaty. However, the U.S. massive bombing against Iraq resulted in the postponement of this action. Nonetheless, the Russian government's effort was sufficiently strong that despite this development, clearly undertaken contrary to Russian advice, the Duma still seemed prepared to ratify START II. At this point Secretary Cohen made his statements that could only be interpreted by an observer as indicating that the United States had essentially made the decision to deploy an ABM system subject only to the checking out of the technical availability of the hardware. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Cite this article

Cited article

Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25,

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited article

Arms Control Adrift? Prospects for 1999


Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25,

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Author Advanced search


    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.