Psychological Operations in Bosnia

By Adams, Thomas K. | Military Review, December-February 1998 | Go to article overview

Psychological Operations in Bosnia

Adams, Thomas K., Military Review

NATO forces used low-intensity nuclear weapons when they conducted air strikes on Serb positions around Sarajevo, Gorazde and Majevica in 1995.

-Serb anti-NATO propaganda

broadcast, September 1997

The lion's share of attention within the special operations forces (SOF) community often goes to SOF's commando-like aspects raids, rescues and the like. However, SOF in Bosnia have found little scope for these activities. Instead, the less glamorous psychological operations (PSYOP) efforts have often taken the lead and, in so doing, may be pointing the way to the future of special operations.

The summer and fall of 1997 brought an increasingly acrimonious power struggle between opposing political leaders in the Republika Srpska (RS). When a faction led by anti-NATO hard-liners began inflammatory broadcasts attacking the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) and the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), it became necessary to counter these broadcasts with factual information. SFOR and its American-led component, Multi-National Division (North) [MND (N)], conducted PSYOP to promote peace using US Air Force EC-130E Commando Solo broadcast aircraft and information leaflets developed by US Army civil affairs and PSYOP personnel.

As in most areas where operations other than war (OOTW) occur, there were few public communication means in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including both the federation and the RS. News magazines were non-existent and newspapers were few, expensive and had limited circulation. Thus, broadcast media were extremely influential, especially the small number of television transmitters still functioning. This became important when a factional dispute threatened to destabilize the elected RS government. One faction, supporting former Serbian leader and indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic, began using the limited television facilities to oppose the GFAP, NATO and the elected government. The broadcasts, for example, routinely referred to Bosnia's Muslim leader as "Alija Izetbegovic, Muslim murderer."1

The Commando Solo Airborne Broadcast Platform

The EC-130E could perform airborne psychological broadcast missions in the standard AM, FM, high frequency, television (TV) and military communication bands. Missions were flown at maximum altitudes to ensure optimum propagation patterns. Highly specialized modifications had been made to the latest EC-130E variant, including enhanced navigation systems, selfprotection equipment and the capability of broadcasting color television on a multitude of global standards throughout the TV VHF/UHF ranges.

Three Air National Guard EC-130Es were deployed from the 193d Special Operations Wing, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to a base in Italy, an hour flight across the Adriatic Sea from Sarajevo. This was a direct response to persistent hostile Bosnian-Serb radio and television propaganda from the Karadzic faction.

Operating from Brindisi, Italy, the EC-130Es were equipped with high-power transmitters for TV, AM and FM radio broadcasting. The planes could also operate as jamming devices against Bosnian-Serb hard-liners' TV and radio broadcasts or simply overpower their signal, blasting them off the air and replacing them with other programs. The aircraft executed three test flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina in September, testing radio broadcasting equipment as a nonviolent "show of force" by SFOR The aircraft successfully broadcast programs from the SFOR radio station "MIR" (peace) without disruptions.

Despite the efforts of both the High Representative and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the dissident RS faction repeatedly refused to cease or moderate their broadcasts. The intemational community took direct action. Under GFAP authority and orders from the NATO Council and the Office of the High Representative, SFOR seized four RS transmission towers.

This reduced but could not eliminate the offending broadcasts because all broadcast media in the RS were state-operated, and SFOR was neither willing nor prepared to control the entire Serbian radio and TV system. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Sign up now for a free, 1-day trial and receive full access to:

  • Questia's entire collection
  • Automatic bibliography creation
  • More helpful research tools like notes, citations, and highlights
  • A full archive of books and articles related to this one
  • Ad-free environment

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Cite this article

Cited article

Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)


1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25,

Cited article

Psychological Operations in Bosnia


Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25,

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

    Already a member? Log in now.