Economists' Misplaced Faith in an Invisible Hand
Klein, Daniel B., Ideas on Liberty
In academia most economists practice technical crafts. Academic incentives strongly favor such crafts, and economists pursue academic rewards, perhaps with a faith in the applicability of "the invisible hand" to their own "industry." But the crafts are mostly irrelevant to policy issues and contribute little to society.
The invisible hand works well when supply-of, say, shoes-caters to customers who purchase with their own money product for their own use. Competing suppliers prosper by best serving demanders. In academia, however, the demand for academic product comes from journal editors, referees, and university departments. The demand is the expression of other suppliers. It is as though shoe demanders were only other shoe makers, who demand shoes not for how well they wear but for aesthetic niceties fancied by the guild. Academic economists tend to favor peers whose crafts exalt their own handiwork. In the social sciences and humanities, demand and supply are highly interlocking, circular, and self-legitimating. The "industry" is more of a craft circle or club. And the club subsists on tax and tuition dollars. The grounds for faith in an invisible hand are rather slight.
Society would gain a great deal if economists became more relevant. Most economists are wiser about economic policy than the average voter. The public needs their help. And in being relevant, economists would better learn economic judgment and become yet wiser.
Who Makes Public Policy?
In fields such as medicine and chemistry important new decisions are made by trained experts. Even when an active patient makes his own medical decisions, he first obtains knowledge about his particular condition and becomes a narrow sort of expert. Unlike an individual making his own medical decisions, however, we decide public policy collectively. In political economy important decisions are made not by trained experts, but by government officials and voters-the Everyman (which of course includes every woman). Politicians must worry about meeting the approval of voters, the Everyman, not economists. Because the Everyman neither expects his vote to make the difference in an election nor anticipates bearing the many hard-to-see drawbacks, he has little incentive to know better about public issues. He often decides rashly, ignorantly, and incompetently.
Not knowing better, the Everyman needs saving from himself. He shoots himself in the foot by building rail transit or government housing, monopolizing letter delivery, subsidizing agriculture, restricting imports or pharmaceuticals, imposing price controls, and imposing licensing restrictions. Foolishness may be avoided by economic enlightenment. Well-intentioned policies have drawbacks that economists can skillfully illuminate.
Building rail transit or government housing means creating public-sector operations that serve society poorly and that no one owns or takes a long-term interest in. Government investment also means the displacing of other, probably more useful investment. Imposing a minimum-wage law means stripping unskilled workers of their chief means of competing against higher-skilled workers and machines. Restricting pharmaceuticals in the name of safety means denying patients drugs they need and discouraging drug development and innovation. Imposing occupational licensing means restricting the supply of services, raising the price, and preventing poor people from entering the occupation and getting a foothold on the economic ladder. Were economists to better engage the Everyman and point out such drawbacks, economists would reduce the not-worth-knowing-better problem.
The Everyman is somewhat like the drunk looking for his lost keys under a lamppost because the light is better there. Assisting the Everyman would require only basic economic ideas. Most economists could provide the analysis needed. In doing so, however, they might not show themselves to be exceptionally smart or clever. …